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Abstract 
This project examines bid protest prevention and resolution strategies to shed 
light on ways to save the government money and time.  Successful resolution of 
protests depends on a number of factors, including government and private sector 
protest management and litigation strategies; Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
policies of federal agencies; legal and regulatory requirements; and remedies 
available to contractors.  Our research identified and analyzed best ADR practices 
and other remedies and preventive methods for resolving bid protests.  Areas 
examined include processes and remedies utilized by selected federal agencies and 
obstacles to fomenting improved cooperation between industry and government, 
which may preclude win-win resolutions to bid protests.  Insights regarding the 
validity of our entering hypotheses about ADR were obtained from a survey of 
acquisition and legal professionals regarding their perceptions, opinions, and 
recommendations on bid protest practices and the use of ADR procedures.  Our 
objectives were to identify ADR and other process improvement recommendations 
that are crucial to effective contracting and support the government’s efforts to 
improve adjudicative forums for resolution of contract disputes and bid protests.  Our 
research suggests that agencies can mitigate protest expenses and interruptions by 
managing the protest process in a systematic, business-like way.  At the present 
time, agencies rarely use most procedural tools that are required or authorized 
under federal laws and regulations to reduce time delays and costs from bid 
protests.  Among other things, we recommend energetic agency approaches to 
preventing disputes (e.g., quality debriefings) and dealing with disputes (e.g., formal 
cost-benefit analysis of agency defense strategies, strong defense of agency 
actions, and full use of ADR methods).  We also recommend ADR as the default 
method for settling bid protests.  
Keywords: Bid Protests, Acquisition Process, Best Practices, Alternative 





















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - iii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank Professor Keith Snider, RADM Jim Greene (Ret.), 
Karey Shaffer, and Tera Yoder of the Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition 
Research Program for their assistance with this paper and related presentations.  
We would also like to thank Dean William Gates, Professor Pete Coughlan, and 
Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Chip Franck of the Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy and Professors Francois Melese and C.J. LaCivita of the 

























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - v - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
About the Authors 
Paul Benishek, LCDR, U.S. Navy; Sealift Plans and Policy Chief, J4, U.S. 
Forces Korea.  LCDR Benishek earned a BA in political science from Iowa State 
University in 1998 and is a supply corps officer with six operational assignments at 
sea. He is a 2009 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School earning an MBA from 
the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy.   
Benjamin Sheinman, LCDR, U.S. Navy; JFSOCC-I Director of Logistics, 
U.S. Forces Iraq.  LCDR Sheinman earned a BA in economics from George 
Washington University.  He is a 2009 graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School 
earning an MBA from the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. 
Max V. Kidalov, Assistant Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy (GSBPP).  He received his BS in 
business economics and finance from the University of South Carolina in 1996, his 
JD from the University of South Carolina in 1999, and his LLM in government 
procurement law from the George Washington University in 2010.  He is admitted to 
practice law before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina.  Dr. Kidalov formerly 
served as Vice Chairman of the Bid Protest Committee, American Bar Association 
Section of Public Contract Law. 
Diana I. Angelis, Associate Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) Defense Resource Management Institute (DRMI), studied accounting at the 
University of Florida and received a BS in business administration in 1977 and a BS 
in electrical engineering in 1985. She received her PhD in industrial and systems 
engineering from the University of Florida in 1996. She was commissioned an officer 
in the United States Air Force in 1984 and served as a program engineer until 1989. 
Dr. Angelis is a certified public accountant and a Lt Col in the US Air Force Reserve. 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - vi - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Point of Contact: 
Max V. Kidalov, J.D., LL.M. 
Assistant Professor of Procurement Law & Policy 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
Tel: (831) 656-3254 


















Better Acquisition Management through Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) and Other Best Practices for Preventing 
and Resolving Bid Protests 
24 January 2012 
by 
LCDR Paul R. Benishek, MBA, 
LCDR Benjamin L. Sheinman, MBA, 
Max V. Kidalov, J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor,  
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Diana I. Angelis, Ph.D., Associate Professor 
Defense Resources Management Institute 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 
 
Disclaimer: The views represented in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy position of 























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - ix - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table of Contents 
I.  Introduction ..................................................................................................... 1 
A.  Purpose ................................................................................................ 1 
B.  Background .......................................................................................... 2 
C.  Research Objective .............................................................................. 3 
D.  Research Questions ............................................................................. 3 
E.  Methodology ......................................................................................... 4 
F.  Thesis Organization .............................................................................. 5 
II.  Background ..................................................................................................... 6 
A.  Introduction ........................................................................................... 7 
B.  Impact on the Acquisition Process........................................................ 9 
C.  Guide to Agency Management of the Protest Process to Minimize Time 
Delays and Costs ............................................................................... 12 
D.  Common Objections to the Use of ADR and Similar Tools; Benefits of 
ADR and Similar Tools in Resolving Protests, and Impact on Major 
Acquisition Programs .......................................................................... 53 
III.  Strategic Protests: Post-Award Bid Protests as Strategies to Maintain 
Competition in the U.S. Defense Industrial Base ................................ 68 
IV.  Survey Methodology ..................................................................................... 84 
A.  Survey Goals ...................................................................................... 85 
B.  Survey Design .................................................................................... 85 
C.  Survey Scoring ................................................................................... 86 
D.  Survey Subjects ................................................................................. 86 
E.  Survey Limitations .............................................................................. 87 
V.  Survey Results and Analysis ......................................................................... 87 
A.  Response Rate and Background Results ........................................... 89 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - x - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
C.  Use of ADR Procedures to Resolve Bid Protests ............................... 94 
D.  Aspects of Current Policies, Practices, Laws, or Regulations That 
Preclude Effective Resolution of Protests ........................................... 96 
E.  Further Analysis of Results ................................................................. 99 
F.  Further Implications .......................................................................... 117 
G.  Respondent Comments and Opinions .............................................. 122 
VI.  Analysis of Federal Aviation Administration and Army Material Command 
Agency Practices .............................................................................. 127 
A.  Introduction to the FAA’S ODRA Process ........................................ 127 
B.  Key Differences Between the FAA’s and the GAO’s Bid Protest 
Process ............................................................................................ 128 
C.  U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Agency-Level Protest Program ...... 130 
D.  Key Differences Between the AMC and GAO’s Bid Protest Process 132 
VII.  Summary and Analysis ............................................................................... 135 
A.  Answers to Research Questions ...................................................... 135 
VIII.  Recommendations and Areas for Further Research ................................... 139 
A.  Recommendations............................................................................ 139 
B.  Areas for Further Research .............................................................. 147 
Appendix A. ADR Definitions ................................................................................. 149 
Appendix B. Research Survey ............................................................................... 153 
Appendix C.  List of Federal Agencies Solicited .................................................... 165 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - xi - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of Figures 
Figure 1.  Competing Interests in a Protest System ............................................... 8 
Figure 2.  Number of Protests Filed at the GAO Since 1989 .................................. 9 
Figure 3.  GAO Bid Protest Statistics, FY2001–FY2008 ......................................... 10 
Figure 4.  Bid Protests at the United States Court of Federal Claims  FY2000–
FY2007 ................................................................................................... 10 
Figure 5.  Agency’s Protest Response ................................................................... 51 
Figure 6.  Survey Respondents’ Professional Backgrounds ................................... 89 
Figure 7.  Respondents by Agency ......................................................................... 90 
Figure 8.  Top 10 Defensive/Preventive Strategies and Practices Identified .......... 92 
Figure 9.  10 Least Cited Defensive/Preventive Strategies and Practices .............. 94 
Figure 10.  The Use of ADR Procedures to Resolve Bid Protests ............................ 96 
Figure 11.  Top 10 Policies, Practices, or Laws That Preclude Effective Avoidance 
or Resolution of Protests ........................................................................ 98 
Figure 12.  10 Least Utilized Factors Precluding Effective Avoidance or Resolution 
of Bid Protests ........................................................................................ 99 
Figure 13.  10 Civilian Agency Strategies Compared to Military Agencies ............... 101 
Figure 14.  Comparison of Civilian and Military Agency Use of ADR Procedures .... 103 
Figure 15.  Comparison of the 10 Most Frequently Identified Civilian and Military 
Agency Perceptions of Processes, Laws, Policies, or Regulations ........ 105 
Figure 16.  Comparison of the 10 Least Frequently Identified Civilian and Military 
Agency Perceptions of Processes, Laws, Policies, or Regulations ........ 106 
Figure 17.  Comparison of the 10 Most Strategies and Practices Most Frequently 
Identified by Legal Professionals With Those Most Frequently 
Identified by Acquisition Professionals ................................................... 108 
Figure 18.  Comparison of 10 Strategies and Practices Least Frequently Identified 
by Legal Professionals with Those Least Frequently Identified by 
Acquisition Professionals ........................................................................ 109 
Figure 19.  Comparison of Legal and Acquisition Perspectives on the Use of ADR 
Procedures to Resolve Bid Protests ....................................................... 110 
Figure 20.  Comparison of the 10 Views Most Frequently Identified by Acquisition 
and Legal Professionals as Factors That Preclude Effective Resolution 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - xii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Figure 21.  Comparison of the 10 Views Least Frequently Identified by Acquisition 
and Legal Professional as Factors That Preclude Effective Resolution 
or Avoidance of Bid Protests .................................................................. 113 
Figure 22.  Comparison of Agency Defensive Strategies and Processes That 
Preclude Effective Resolution of Protests ............................................... 115 
Figure 23.  Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies Used to Counteract 
Delays Caused by Bid Protests .............................................................. 118 
Figure 24.  Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies Used to Reduce Costs 
Associated With Bid Protests ................................................................. 120 
Figure 25.  Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies Used to Reduce 
Protestor’s Inclination to Protest for Strategic Business Reasons .......... 121 
Figure 26.  Respondents’ Comments on Factors That Motivate a Protester to 
Utilize, or Constrain a Protestor From Utilizing, Agency Protest 
Procedures ............................................................................................. 124 
Figure 27.  Respondent Comments on the Lack of Disincentives to Protest ............ 125 
Figure 28.  Comparison of GAO and FAA Timelines of Key Protest Milestones....... 130 
Figure 29.  Comparison of GAO and AMC Timelines of Key Protest Milestones 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - xiii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of Tables 
Table 1.  FY2009 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................. 72 
Table 2.  FY2008 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................. 73 
Table 3.  FY2007 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................. 74 
Table 4.  FY2006 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................. 75 
Table 5.  FY 2005 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................ 76 
Table 6.  FY 2004 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................ 77 
Table 7.  FY2003 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................. 78 
Table 8.  FY2002 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................. 79 
Table 9.  FY2001 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts ............................. 80 






















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - xv - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of Charts 
Chart 1.  GAO Protest Process (Planning/Request for Information) .................. 15 
Chart 2.  GAO Protest Process (Request for Proposal/Request for 
Quotations/Invitation for Bid) .............................................................. 17 
Chart 3.  GAO Protest Process (Proposal Evaluation, Pre-Award Competitive 
Range) ................................................................................................ 19 
Chart 4.  GAO Protest Process (Post Award) .................................................... 22 
Chart 5.  GAO Protest Process (Agency Response) ......................................... 24 
Chart 6.  GAO Protest Process (Recommended Relief) ................................... 29 
Chart 7.  Agency-Level Protest ......................................................................... 36 






















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - xvii - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ADR  Alternative Dispute Resolution 
AMC  Army Materiel Command 
AMS  Acquisition Management Systems 
C.F.R.   Code of Federal Regulations  
CICA  Completion in Contracting Act 
CO  Contracting Officer 
CRS  Congressional Research Service 
DLA  Defense Logistics Agency 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DoT Department of Transportation 
DRO Dispute Resolution Officer 
E.O. Executive Order 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR  Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
FY Fiscal Year 
GAO  General Accounting Office 
Government Accountability Office 
GSBCA  General Services Board of Contract Appeals 
NLT Not Later Than 
ODRA  Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition 
RFP  Request for Proposals 
SAP Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
USAF  United States Air Force 
U.S.C.  United States Code 























do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 1 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
I. Introduction  
A. Purpose 
The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, U.S. Department of the 
Air Force, and the Acquisition Research Program of the Naval Postgraduate School 
commissioned a multi-disciplinary team from the Naval Postgraduate School’s 
Defense Resource Management Institute and Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy to study strategies to minimize time delays and costs borne by defense 
acquisition programs as a result of bid protests.  This is the second companion 
report in this study; it follows the first report entitled A New Paradigm to Address Bid 
Protests (Melese, Angelis, LaCivita, Kidalov, Coughlan, Franck, and Gates, 2010). 
Bid protests are defined by the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA; 
2010) as  
Written objection by an interested party to any of the following: a solicitation 
by an agency for offers for a contract for the procurement of property or 
services, the cancellation of the solicitation, an award or proposed award of 
the contract, and the termination of an award of the contract if the written 
objection contains an allegation that the termination is based in part, on the 
improprieties concerning the award of the contract. (31 U.S.C. § 3551(1)) 
The successful resolutions of protests depends on a number of factors, 
including government and private sector litigation strategies, the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) policies of federal agencies, legal and regulatory requirements, 
precedential interpretations, and remedies available to contractors.  In the report that 
follows, we conclude that better ADR practices and other prevention and resolution 
strategies need to be identified and implemented.  The purpose of this project was to 
evaluate bid protest prevention and resolutions strategies and identify best practices 
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B. Background 
In any bid protest system, there are four principal parties: the disappointed 
offeror denied a contract award or potential offeror excluded from competition, the 
acquiring agency, the public at large and their elected representatives, and, possibly, 
an intervening offeror or successful awardee.  Each principal has a distinct interest 
in the resolution of the protest.  The unsuccessful offerors seek a forum to air their 
complaints, learn as much information as possible about denial or exclusion, and, 
ultimately, obtain some type of meaningful relief.  The acquiring agency seeks a 
resolution to the protest in a manner that does not hinder the effectiveness or 
efficiency of the acquisition process.  The public seeks a resolution that promotes 
the integrity and effectiveness of the acquisition system while holding government 
officials accountable for their actions (Gordon, 2006, p. 430-432).  The intervening 
offeror seeks resolution that supports the original award or favorable terms for 
award.   
There are a number of fora where a protestor can seek relief.  Protests can 
be filed with the procuring agency (FAR, 2010, § 33.103(c)), with the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO; CICA, 2010, 31 U.S.C. § 3551 et. seq.), or the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims (Tucker Act, 2010, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)).  The Comptroller 
General, head of the GAO, is mandated by CICA to provide “for the inexpensive and 
expeditious resolution of protests” (CICA, 2010, 31 U.S.C. § 3554 (a)(1)).  In 1995, 
President William J. Clinton signed Executive Order (E.O.) No. 12,979 mandating 
that agencies, “to the maximum extent practicable, provide for inexpensive, informal, 
procedurally simple, and expeditious resolution of protests, including, where 
appropriate and as permitted by law, the use of alternative resolution techniques.” In 
that Executive Order(1995), President Clinton stated that these measures were 
intended “to ensure effective and efficient expenditure of public funds and fair and 
expeditious resolution of protests to the award of Federal procurement contracts.” In 
Subpart 33.1, Protests, the Federal Acquisition Regulation also incorporates the 
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means by which the GAO and federal agencies can put into practice these legal 
obligations. 
During fiscal year (FY) 2008, 1,652 bid protests were filed with the GAO.  The 
GAO issued formal decisions in 291 cases, sustaining 60 protests (more detailed 
statistics are provided in Chapter II).  In the same year, the GAO utilized self-
described ADR practices to resolve 78 cases, citing a 78% success rate.  Success in 
these instances is defined as resolution absent a formal GAO decision (Kepplinger, 
2008).  In general, the GAO utilizes two types of ADR, negotiation assistance at the 
beginning and outcome prediction at the end of litigation (where the majority of costs 
and delays have already been incurred; GAO, Office of the General Counsel, 2009).  
The only substantial difference between outcome prediction and a formal decision is 
the issuance of a written decision by the GAO.  In terms of time, effort, and cost, the 
processes are nearly identical. 
C. Research Objective 
The objective of this project was to specifically identify, analyze, and develop 
better ADR practices and other prevention and resolution strategies to control 
protest costs and delays.  Such practices and strategies must, at a minimum, 
provide an interested party with the opportunity for meaningful relief, promote the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the acquisition system, and preserve the public’s trust 
in the fairness of the acquisition process. 
D. Research Questions 
Because this project consisted of the identification and analysis of best ADR 
practices for resolving bid protests, the main focus revolved around the following 
primary research question: What ADR strategies, remedies, or practices exist that, if 
adopted by the Department of Defense (DoD), would lessen the systemic impact of 
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Specific areas addressed consist of processes and remedies utilized by 
selected federal agencies and the barriers to more effective cooperation between 
industry and government that may prohibit give-and-take compromises resulting in 
acceptable bid protest resolutions.  Our analysis also answers the following research 
questions: 
 What strategies or practices are currently being used to minimize the 
impact of bid protest delays and costs on the acquisition process while 
maintaining integrity, economy, and efficiency? 
 What current processes or regulations preclude effective avoidance or 
resolution of bid protests in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts on 
the acquisition system? 
 What are the obstacles that impede effective cooperation in resolving bid 
protests? 
This research provides decision makers with a usable analysis of current best 
practice examples along with recommendations. 
E. Methodology 
This project was based on a general literature review, including federal 
agency reports from the General Accounting Office, Department of Defense and 
Service component regulations, reports, journal articles, written texts, web searches, 
and surveys conducted with General Counsel and Acquisition leadership personnel 
within the military services and select federal/DoD agencies.  The research 
methodologies for this project included the following: 
 A survey of Legal and Acquisition leadership within the military 
services and select federal/DoD agencies. 
 A review of academic literature, government reports, government 
regulations and statutes, and other professional papers. 
 An analysis and comparison of bid protest practices within the Army 
Materiel Command (AMC), the GAO, and the Federal Aviation 
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F. Thesis Organization 
This report is organized into seven chapters.  Chapter II provides an overview 
of the current bid protest process along with background information.  Chapter III 
provides an analysis of FAA and AMC bid protest procedures compared with those 
of the GAO.  Chapter IV describes our survey goals, design, methodology, and 
scoring.  Chapter V discusses our survey results and provides an in-depth analysis 
of the results.  Chapter VI is our conclusion, summarizing the results of our project.  


























In a 2006 paper entitled “Constructing a Bid Protest Process: Choices Every 
Procurement Challenge System Must Make,” current Administrator for Federal 
Procurement Policy and then-GAO Associate General Counsel Daniel Gordon, 
described a protest as an action that is “always between the agency and a vendor 
that wants but does not have a contract” (p. 429).  A protester is typically a party 
aggrieved by the actions of a government agency that resulted or could result in the 
award of a contract to an offeror viewed by the protester as non-deserving for 
various reasons.  The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA; 2010), the Tucker Act 
(2010, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)), the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR Subpart 33.1; 
2010), and the GAO Bid Protest Regulations (2010, 4 C.F.R., §§ 21.0-.10) permit 
protests to be resolved through judicial or administrative litigation, but informal 
procedures are encouraged.  One of the key requirements to prevail in a bid protest 
is showing that the protester has been prejudiced by improper agency activities.  
The mere presence of a mistake or illegal action does not necessarily imply a protest 
has merit unless the protestor can show they were in some way prejudiced by the 
agency’s mistake or illegal activity  (FAR, 2010, § 33.103; Myers Investigative & 
Security Services v. United States, 2002).  In other words, the mistake or illegality 
must affect acquisition planning or award decision.  A protester who prevails is 
entitled to a remedy, usually in the form of corrections in the bidding process or 
monetary reimbursement of bid and proposal costs and/or legal consultation fees. 
The Comptroller General of the Government Accountability Office is 
mandated by the CICA to provide “for the inexpensive and expeditious resolution of 
protests” (2010, 31 U.S.C. § 3554 (a)(1)). With this legal mandate comes a 
necessary duty to serve the public interest.  As noted by the GAO’s then-General 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 8 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
to balance the competing interests and goals of the procurement process . 
. . [because] the presence of an independent forum for disappointed 
bidders enhances the accountability of procurement officials and 
agencies, opens a window of transparency into how the procurement 
system operates, and protects the integrity and legitimacy of a competitive 
and robust federal procurement process. (p. 1) 
 
At the center of any bid protest is a certain inherent conflict between the 
needs of the agency concerned and the rights of the disappointed bidder.  An 
efficient bid protest process must ensure protests are handled expeditiously, thereby 
minimizing the disruption to the acquisition process.  An effective system must 
ensure disappointed bidders are given a forum to air their grievances and agency 
officials are held accountable for their actions (Worthington & Goldsman, 1998, p. 
472).  Figure 1 illustrates this concept. 
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B. Impact on the Acquisition Process 
The number of protests filed increased by 37% between FY 2001 and FY 
2008 (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 2).  Bid protests continue to have a systemic 
impact on the acquisition system.  Figure 2 illustrates the trend in protests at the 
GAO over the last 20 years.   
 
Figure 2. Number of Protests Filed at the GAO Since 1989  
(Kepplinger, 2009a, p. 7) 
Though the number of protests has declined in historical terms, it is worth 
noting the increase in protests starting in FY 2001.  The number of protests filed at 
the GAO increased by 37% between FY 2001 and FY 2008 (Schwartz & Manuel, 
2009, p. 2).  Figure 3 contains detailed GAO bid protest statistics for FYs 2001–
2008.  Data we retrieved from the Federal Procurement Data System shows that 
over the same period the number of federal contract actions fell by 26.79%, from 
11,410,869 to 8,354,648, while total federal procurement dollars jumped by 
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Figure 3. GAO Bid Protest Statistics, FY2001–FY2008  
(Schaengold, Guiffré, & Gill, 2009, p. 255) 
The number of bid protests filed with the United States Court of Federal 
Claims is presented in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Bid Protests at the United States Court of Federal Claims  
FY2000–FY2007  
(Schaengold, Guiffré, & Gill, 2009, p. 255) 
Bid protests continue to have a systemic impact on the acquisition system.  
No federal agency is more acutely aware of this trend than the Department of 
Defense.  As noted in 2007 by then Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), the Honorable John J. Young,  
Protests are extremely detrimental to the warfighter and the taxpayer, 
[they] consume vast amounts of the time of acquisition, legal, and 
requirements team members; delay program initiation and the delivery of 
capability; strain relations with our industry partners and stakeholders; and 
create misperceptions among American citizens. (as cited in Crean, 2008, 
p. 3) 
FY 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Protests Filed 1,146        1,204        1,352      1,485      1,356      1,327      1,411        1,652     




311 256 290 365 306 249 335 291
Sustained in 
Whole or Part
66(21%) 41(16%) 50(17%) 75(21%) 71(23%) 72(29%) 91(27%) 60(21%)
Effectiveness Rate 33% 33% 33% 34% 37% 39% 38% 42%
Cases Resolved 
Through ADR




63(12%) 23(5%) 74(13%) 56(9%) 41(8%) 51(11%) 41(8%) 32(6%)
FY 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number of Cases 
Involving Bid Protests 54 57 39 55 69 61 73 70
Percentage of Cases 
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In general, all protests can potentially involve a delay in contract award or 
performance as well as internal and out-of-pocket costs.  The much-publicized case 
of the U.S. Air Force’s KC-X Air Refueling Tanker clearly demonstrates the impact 
protests can have on the acquisition system.  In January 2007, the Air Force issued 
a Request for Proposals (RFP; GAO, 2008, p. 5).  On February 29, 2008, the Air 
Force selected Northrop Grumman for contract award.  On March 11, 2008, Boeing 
filed a protest with the GAO, which the GAO sustained in a written decision on June 
18, 2008 (Gordon, 2008, p. 3).  During the lengthy protest litigation, the Air Force 
paid the salaries of its 19-lawyer defense team, and the GAO decision 
recommended that the Air Force pay the fees of the 15 attorneys of record 
representing Boeing.  By February 2010, the Air Force once again issued a “new” 
draft RFP for the KC-X tanker (U.S. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Center, 2010, p. 
1).  To date, no award has been made.  Despite the merit the GAO found in Boeing’s 
protest (i.e., lack of discipline in the USAF source selection), there was a 
countervailing deleterious impact on the acquisition process.  For a period of over 
two years, the Air Force has been unable to award a contract for an air refueling 
tanker.  In fact, during 2008, bid protests delayed three major defense acquisition 
programs, valued at over $70 million (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 10). Such 
situations clearly underscore the point made by Undersecretary Young. 
Although the GAO has consistently resolved all protests within their required 
statutory time frame of 100 days (Schwartz & Manuel, 2009, p. 9), the systemic 
impact of protests still remains.  Both industry and government should welcome the 
implementation of a policy that could reduce this impact.  Alternative Dispute 
Resolution is one such policy tool that, if used effectively, has such potential.  Other 
policy tools include flexibilities such as stay overrides, express options, and other 
similar measures provided under current laws and regulations.  Additionally, these 
tools have the potential to preserve the delicate balance between the competing 
interests of the bid protest process and to empower military and civilian agencies to 
reduce protest costs and delays.  In order to understand this fully, Federal agency 
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path they follow on their way to resolution, the defensive strategies that can be used 
to prevent protests and control their resolution path, and the cost and benefit trade-
offs agencies face from various protest defense strategies.   
C. Guide to Agency Management of the Protest Process to 
Minimize Time Delays and Costs 
1. The Legal Toolbox for Bid Protest Resolution and Prevention 
Bid protests in the Federal procurement system are generally heard in one of 
three fora: at the agency level, the Procurement Law Control Group of the GAO 
Office of General Counsel, or the Court of Federal Claims (COFC).  Agency-level 
protests are the quickest, least formal, and least procedure oriented, and they 
provide the least access to information, while the judicial process at the COFC is, 
arguably, the longest, most formal, and most procedure oriented, and, potentially, it 
provides the most access to information, including formal discovery and depositions 
of contracting officers.  The GAO is a much more prolific forum than the COFC.  
However, workload comparison with agency-level protests is not possible because 
agency-level protests data are not available across the government. 
Protests are governed primarily by the following laws and regulations: the 
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3557, 2010) and GAO 
Bid Protest Regulations (4 C.F.R. Part 21, 2010) for protests at the GAO; the Tucker 
Act (28 U.S.C. § 1491, 2010) and Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (2011) for 
protests at the COFC as well as for review of agency conduct, such as stay 
overrides, in GAO protests; Executive Order 12,979 (60 FR 55171, 1995) for 
agency-level protests; and FAR Subpart 33.1 for all of the above.  Agency-level FAR 
supplements and mandatory procedures, as well as judicial precedents, provide 
additional direction for resolving bid protests.  The Administrative Dispute Resolution 
Act of 1990, as amended (5 U.S.C. § 572, 2010) governs ADR.  All of these 
authorities contain numerous tools for preventing, avoiding, and resolving bid 
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This Guide (Subchapter II (c) of this Report), for the first time ever, attempts 
to fuse legal knowledge into an engineering design framework in order to construct 
bid protest prevention and resolution flowcharts that enable government officials 
faced with protests to make least disruptive and most cost-effective decisions.  In 
doing so, this Guide draws not only from the previously mentioned statutes and 
regulations, but also from the combined perspective of professional and academic 
literature such as: 
 the GAO’s Bid Protests at the GAO: Descriptive Guide (GAO-09-
471SP; GAO, Office of General Counsel, 2008);  
 the 2009 article “Choice of Forum for Federal Government Contract 
Bid Protests” by Schaengold, Guiffré, and Gill;  
 the 2003 Spriggs and Kidalov article “No Way to Protest”;  
 the 2009 Sacilotto article “Is the Game Worth the Candle? The Fate of 
the CICA Override”;  
 two 2005 Troff articles, “The United States Agency-Level Bid Protest 
Mechanism: A Model for Bid Challenge Procedures in Developing 
Nations” and Agency-Level Bid Protest Reform: Time for a Little Less 
Efficiency?; and  
 two Congressional Research Service reports: the 2009 Schwartz and 
Manuel report GAO Bid Protests: Trends, Analysis, and Options for 
Congress; and the 2010 Schwartz and Manuel report, GAO Bid 
Protests: An Overview of Timeframes and Procedures. 
In general, a protest may occur at any of the following five stages in the 
acquisition process: 
 Stage 1. Prior to solicitation (e.g., during acquisition planning, and 
publication of FAR Subpart 15.2 Requests for Information or FAR Part 
5 Synopsis); 
 Stage 2. During the solicitation (e.g., issued as FAR Part 15 Requests 
for Proposals, FAR Part 14 Invitation for Bids, or Requests for 
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 Stage 3. During the evaluation (e.g., at creation of the competitive 
range under FAR Part 15 and consequent exclusion of certain offerors 
from further consideration); 
 Stage 4. Post award; and 
 Stage 5. After agency-level protest (to the GAO or COFC) or GAO 
protest (to the COFC). 
Depending on the bid protest forum, specifically, its formality, and on the 
stage of the procurement, the legal toolbox for preventing and resolving protests 
includes multiple tools for bid protest prevention and resolution.  Prior to the protest, 
an agency may always employ pro-competitive acquisition strategies and provide 
more thorough debriefings.  At the agency level, these tools involve early corrective 
actions and advance agreements with potential protesters for extended stay of the 
procurement process during follow-on GAO protests.  At the GAO, these tools 
include mandatory stay overrides, bridge contracts, motions to dismiss as frivolous 
or meritless, early corrective actions, ADR, express option requests, declaratory 
relief, payment of protest costs, refusals to follow GAO recommendations, and 
refusals to exercise options.  At the Court of Federal Claims, these tools include 
Motions to Dismiss; opposition to temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctions; 
requests for bonds to pay for the cost of stay; Motions for Judgment on 
Administrative Record; requests to consider national defense or national security 
grounds; ADR; and Rule 11 sanctions for frivolous protests.       
2. Protests at the GAO 
The GAO protest process offers several disadvantages to the agency, 
including mandatory stay of the procurement in many circumstances up to 100 days, 
extensive discovery/production of documents, possible contracting officer 
participation in hearings, and possible payment of bid and proposal costs and 
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a. Filing of GAO Protest at the Stage of Synopsis or Request 
for Information (RFI) Prior To Procurement 
As shown in Chart 1, the process begins when the agency announces an 
acquisition strategy through a FAR Part 5 synopsis of a proposed contract or 
publishes a FAR Part 10 Request for Information (RFI).  A protest filed at this stage 
typically concerns the types of products or services the agency intends to buy, the 
method of procurement, or the types or sizes of prospective eligible bidders.  Upon 
filing, the GAO gives notice of protest to the agency.  By operation of law, the GAO’s 
notice triggers a mandatory stay of the procurement.   
 
Chart 1. GAO Protest Process (Planning/Request for Information)  
 To reduce costs or time delays resulting from a mandatory stay, the agency 
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circumstances,” as long as it intends to make the award within 30 days.  At this 
stage in the procurement process, such overrides can usually benefit procurements 
of commercial items or procurements under simplified acquisition procedures.  
Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation, agencies are generally required to publish 
a synopsis and a solicitation.  The typical procurement administrative lead time 
(PALT) for such publications is 45 days.  However, PALT can be reduced to fewer 
than 30 days for procurements of commercial items under FAR Part 12 or 
procurements under simplified acquisition procedures in FAR Part 13.    
A protester is able to review the stay override at the Court of Federal Claims 
(CFC).  The CFC will make a separate determination of whether “urgent and 
compelling circumstances” exist and of whether the agency intends to make the 
award within 30 days.  If the CFC sustains the agency’s override of the stay, the 
agency is able to move the procurement program along by issuing the solicitation.   
Least Disruptive/Most Cost-Effective Strategies: The least disruptive/most 
cost-effective strategies at the GAO at this stage involve two strategies: 
1) seeking an override of the stay based on urging and compelling 
circumstances if the award is to be made within 30 days; or 
2) withdrawing or cancelling of the synopsis or RFI in favor of a more pro-
competitive acquisition strategy.   
b. Filing of GAO Protests at the Stage of Solicitation 
As shown in Chart 2, the process begins when the agency issues a 
solicitation, such as a FAR Part 15 Request for Proposals (RFP) or a FAR Part 14 
Invitation for Bids (IFB).  A protester (potential offeror or bidder) files a protest.  Upon 
filing, the GAO gives notice of protest to the agency.  By operation of law, the GAO’s 
notice triggers a mandatory stay of the procurement.   
To reduce costs or time delays resulting from a mandatory stay, the agency 
can override the mandatory stay on the grounds of (1) “urgent and compelling 
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best interests of the United States.  The agency’s ability to secure an override on 
“urgent and compelling” grounds depends on whether offers were submitted.  If 
offers were submitted, the agency must seek to obtain an extension of bids or offers.  
If extensions are not granted, the agency may assert an “urgent and compelling” 
override.  If extensions are granted, the agency may assert only the “interests of the 
United States” override.   
 
Chart 2. GAO Protest Process (Request for Proposal/Request for 
Quotations/Invitation for Bid) 
 A protester is able to obtain a review of the stay override at the Court of 
Federal Claims (CFC).  The CFC will make a separate determination of whether 
“best interest of the United States” grounds exist, whether “urgent and compelling 
circumstances” exist, and whether the agency intends to make the award within 30 
days.  If the CFC sustains the agency’s override of the stay, the agency is able to 
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Least Disruptive/Most Cost-Effective Strategies: The least disruptive/most 
cost-effective strategies at this stage of the GAO protest involve 
1) withdrawing or cancelling the solicitation and revision in favor of a 
more pro-competitive acquisition strategy; 
2) if offers, bids, or quotes were already submitted, seeking extensions; 
3) if extensions are not granted or no bids, offers, or quotes were 
submitted, and award is expected within 30 days, seeking an override 
of mandatory stay for urgent and compelling circumstances; or 
4) seeking override on the grounds of best interests of the United States.  
If the agency subsequently loses the protest, the GAO is required to 
recommend relief regardless of the impact on the procurement 
program. 
c. Filing of GAO Protest at the Pre-Award Stage of Proposal 
Evaluation and Exclusion from Competitive Range 
As shown in Chart 3, the process begins when the agency has received offers 
in response to FAR Part 15 Request for Proposals (RFP), conducted an initial 
evaluation of proposals, and created the competitive range by excluding some 
offerors.  An agency gives these offerors a notice of exclusion from the competitive 
range within 3 days of exclusion decision. 
An excluded offeror has 3 days from the notice of exclusion from the 
competitive range to request a mandatory debriefing.  The agency must provide a 
debriefing as soon as possible if the excluded offeror requests it within 3 days of the 
notice.  However, the agency may make a determination to provide such a 
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Chart 3. GAO Protest Process (Proposal Evaluation, Pre-Award 
Competitive Range) 
If the agency objects to providing a debriefing prior to the award, a protester 
has 10 days from the date of the notice of exclusion to file a protest in order to obtain 
a mandatory stay.  If an excluded offeror waits beyond 3 days from the date of the 
notice to ask for a debriefing, the agency is not legally obligated to provide a 
debriefing, either pre-award or post-award.  However, an agency may offer a non-
mandatory debriefing.  Again, an excluded offeror has 10 days from the date of 
notice to file a protest in order to obtain a mandatory stay.   
If an agency agrees to offer a pre-award mandatory debriefing, an excluded 
offeror must file a protest within 5 days of first date offered by the agency for 
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If an excluded offeror waits beyond 10 days from the date of notice or, in the 
case of a mandatory debriefing request, 5 days from the first date offered for 
debriefing, an agency may impose a discretionary stay.       
A protester (excluded offeror) files a protest.  Upon filing, the GAO gives 
notice of the protest to the agency.  By operation of law, the GAO’s notice triggers a 
mandatory stay of the procurement, provided the protest was filed within 10 days 
from the date of notice or, in the case of a mandatory debriefing request, 5 days 
from the first date offered for debriefing.   
To reduce costs or time delays resulting from a mandatory stay, the agency 
can override the mandatory stay on the grounds of (1) “urgent and compelling 
circumstances,” as long as it intends to make the award within 30 days; and/or (2) 
the best interests of the United States.  The agency’s ability to secure an override on 
“urgent and compelling” grounds depends on whether offers were submitted.  If 
offers were submitted, the agency must seek to obtain an extension of bids or offers.  
If extensions are not granted, the agency may assert an “urgent and compelling” 
override.  If extensions are granted, the agency may assert only the “best interests 
of the United States” override.  If an agency decides to pursue a “best interests” 
override, proceeds to file an agency report as a defense, and subsequently loses the 
protest, the law authorizes the GAO to recommend relief, regardless of the impact 
on the program.  
A protester is able to obtain a review of the stay override at the Court of 
Federal Claims (CFC).  The CFC will make a separate determination of whether 
“best interests of the United States” exist, whether “urgent and compelling 
circumstances” exist, and whether the agency intends to make the award within 30 
days.  If the CFC sustains the agency’s override of the stay, the agency is able to 
move the procurement program along by evaluating the offers or bids received. 
Least Disruptive/Most Cost-Effective Strategies: The least disruptive/most 
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1) holding untimely requested debriefings (as a mitigation measure) or 
refusal to hold untimely debriefings, as may be appropriate;  
2) making objections to the debriefing until after the award;  
3) seeking an override of mandatory stay for urgent and compelling 
circumstances; or 
4) seeking an override of mandatory stay on the grounds of the best 
interests of the United States.  If the agency subsequently loses the 
protest, the GAO is required to recommend relief, regardless of the 
impact on the procurement program. 
Imposing a discretionary stay at this stage is not recommended as a measure 
to prevent disruption of the procurement process, as there may be other protests 
after the award on similar grounds.  However, agency procurement officials should 
take into account the allegations made in the protest at this stage and ensure that 
the evaluations are consistent with the solicitation criteria.   
d. Filing of GAO Protest Post-Award 
As shown in Chart 4, the process begins when the agency makes a contract 
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Chart 4. GAO Protest Process (Post Award) 
An excluded offeror has 3 days from the notice of award to request a 
mandatory debriefing.  The agency must provide a mandatory debriefing within 5 
days of the award decision if an excluded offeror requests within 3 days of the 
notice.  If an excluded offeror does not request a debriefing, the offeror has 10 days 
from the date of the notice of award to file a protest in order to obtain a mandatory 
stay.  If an excluded offeror waits beyond 3 days from the date of the notice to ask 
for a debriefing, the agency is not legally obligated to provide a debriefing, but an 
agency may offer a non-mandatory debriefing.  Again, an excluded offeror has 10 
days from the date of notice to file a protest in order to obtain a mandatory stay.   
If an excluded offeror requested a debriefing within 3 days of the notice of 
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5 days of the first date offered by the agency for mandatory debriefing in order to 
obtain a mandatory stay.   
If an excluded offeror waits beyond 10 days from the date of notice or, in the 
case of mandatory debriefing request, 5 days from the first date offered for a 
debriefing, an agency may impose a discretionary stay.       
An excluded offeror becomes a protester by filing a protest.  Upon filing, the 
GAO gives notice of protest to the agency.  By operation of law, the GAO’s notice 
triggers a mandatory stay of the procurement, provided the protest was filed within 
10 days from the date of notice or, in the case of a mandatory debriefing request, 5 
days from the first date offered for debriefing.   
To reduce costs or time delays resulting from a mandatory stay, the agency 
can override the mandatory stay on the grounds of (1) “urgent and compelling 
circumstances,” and/or (2) the best interests of the United States.  The agency’s 
ability to secure override based on the “best interests” grounds depends on whether 
the protester is an incumbent contractor.  If the protester is an incumbent contractor, 
the agency must decide whether to place a bridge contract extending the 
incumbent’s performance.  Only if the agency does not place a bridge contract will it 
be able to assert the best interests override.     
A protester is able to obtain a review of the stay override at the Court of 
Federal Claims (CFC).  The CFC will make a separate determination of whether 
“best interest of the United States” grounds exist, and whether “urgent and 
compelling circumstances” exist.  If the CFC sustains the agency’s override of the 
stay, the agency is able to move the procurement program along by evaluating the 
offers or bids received. 
Least Disruptive/Most Cost-Effective Strategies: The least disruptive/most 
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1) holding untimely requested debriefings (as a mitigation measure) or 
refusal to hold untimely debriefings, as may be appropriate; 
2) imposing a discretionary stay if a belated, but apparently meritorious, 
protest was filed;  
3) if the protester is an incumbent - seeking to place a bridge contract for 
the pendency of the protest while the award is subject to mandatory 
stay;  
4) seeking an override of mandatory stay for urgent and compelling 
circumstances; or 
5) seeking an override of mandatory stay on the grounds of best interests 
of the United States.  If the agency subsequently loses the protest, the 
GAO is required to recommend relief regardless of the impact on the 
procurement program. 
3. Agency Response Strategies to Filing of Protest at the GAO 
As shown in Chart 5, an agency has five (5) options with which to respond to 
the filing of a protest. 
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The first option for the agency is to move to dismiss the protest on the 
grounds that the protest was frivolous, meritless, or outside the GAO jurisdiction.  
This option allows the agency to avoid close to 100 days of delay (the statutory time 
limit for a GAO bid protest); to preserve the agency’s acquisition strategy, its 
competitive range, or its award decision; to prevent discovery and extensive 
production of documents; to save the agency’s legal and administrative costs of 
defending the protest; and to avoid potential payments of the protester’s legal fees 
as well as the protester’s bid and proposal preparation costs.  The protester can 
respond to the agency motion by withdrawing the protest or opposing the motion.  If 
the protester opposes the motion, the GAO may dismiss the protest with a summary 
dismissal, dismiss it with a dismissal opinion, or refuse to dismiss the protest.         
In the alternative, the agency’s second option is to undertake corrective action 
by affording the protester some form of relief.  This option allows the agency to avoid 
close to 100 days of delay (the statutory time limit for a GAO bid protest); to save the 
agency’s legal and administrative costs of defending the protest; and to avoid 
potential payments of the protester’s legal fees.  However, corrective action may 
involve changing or reversing the agency’s acquisition strategy, its competitive 
range, or its award decision; payment of the protester’s bid and proposal preparation 
costs; or other relief to the protester.  The protester may either agree to the 
corrective action or request further corrective action.  An agency may refuse further 
corrective action and proceed to its third or fourth options. 
As another alternative, the agency’s third option is to engage in Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR).  This option allows the agency to avoid close to 100 days 
of delay (the statutory time limit for a GAO bid protest); to save the agency’s legal 
and administrative costs of defending the protest; and to avoid potential payments of 
the protester’s legal fees.  However, corrective action may involve changing or 
reversing the agency’s acquisition strategy, its competitive range, or its award 
decision; payment of the protester’s bid and proposal preparation costs; or other 
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use ADR.  If the protester agrees to use ADR, the ADR can take the form of 
negotiation assistance facilitated by the GAO or ADR without GAO involvement, 
such as direct negotiation, mediation, or arbitration.  If ADR succeeds, it can result in 
corrective action or withdrawal of a protest.  If ADR fails, the agency can proceed to 
option four, agency defense by agency report.  The regulatory timing for filing the 
agency report within 30 days from the date of the award is not affected by the 
agency’s decision to pursue ADR.   
As yet another alternative, the agency’s fourth option is to defend the 
procurement by filing its defense in the form of an agency report within 30 days of 
the filing of the protest.  This option allows the agency an opportunity to protect its 
acquisition strategy, competitive range decision, or award decision.  However, the 
agency will incur a delay of up to 100 days (the statutory time limit for a GAO bid 
protest) and incur legal and administrative costs of defending against a protest.  
Further, if an agency takes this option and subsequently loses a protest, it will be 
obligated to pay the protester’s legal fees and costs.  If an agency takes this option 
and subsequently loses a protest after a “best interests” override was put in place, 
the law authorizes the GAO to recommend relief regardless of the impact on the 
acquisition program.   
A protester may file opposing comments or withdraw a protest.  The protester 
may also file a supplemental protest.  The agency is able to exercise the same 
response option in regards to the supplemental protest as in regards to the original 
protest, and the GAO will consolidate all protests together for a single resolution.  
The protester may also request a hearing.  The GAO may conduct a hearing on one 
or all protests, in which case the parties will be asked to file post-hearing comments.   
Following the full exchange of comments, the GAO may conduct an outcome 
prediction ADR.  During outcome prediction, the GAO will recommend either to 
sustain or to deny the protest.  If the GAO recommends to sustain the protest and 
the agency agrees, an agency may take corrective action in accordance with the 
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recommends a denial or if the agency or the protester disagree with the outcome 
prediction, they can ask the GAO to issue an opinion.   
Once the GAO issues an opinion, with or without outcome prediction, the 
parties may ask for reconsideration.  If the GAO opinion (including the 
reconsideration request) denies the protest, the protester may file a protest at the 
Court of Federal Claims.  If the GAO opinion (including reconsideration) sustains the 
protest and recommends relief, the agency can provide the protester with the 
recommended relief or refuse to follow the GAO recommendation.  The GAO will 
report the agency to Congress and recommend sanctions or relief, including private 
relief legislation, rescission or cancellation of funds, Congressional investigation, or 
other action.  Further, if the agency refuses to follow the GAO recommendation, it 
can request the Office of Federal Procurement Policy within the Office of 
Management and Budget or the Office of Legal Counsel within the Justice 
Department to issue an opinion supporting its position. 
In addition to the fourth option, the agency may also undertake the fifth 
option: a request for an express option.  This request must be made not later than 5 
days after protest filing.  Under this option, the agency would defend the 
procurement by filing its defense in the form of an agency report within 30 days of 
the filing of the protest.  This option allows the agency an opportunity to protect its 
acquisition strategy, competitive range decision, or award decision.  However, the 
agency will incur a delay of up to 65 days, instead of the usual 100 days (the 
statutory time limit for a GAO bid protest), and incur the legal and administrative 
costs of defending against a protest.  Further, if an agency takes this option and 
subsequently loses a protest, it will be obligated to pay the protester’s legal fees and 
costs.  If an agency takes this option and subsequently loses a protest after a “best 
interests” override was put in place, the law authorizes the GAO to recommend relief 
regardless of the impact on the program.   
Least Disruptive/Most Cost-Effective Strategies: The least disruptive/most 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 28 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
1) filing aggressive requests to dismiss protests as frivolous, meritless, or 
lacking jurisdiction;  
2) instituting an early corrective action and settlement;   
3) instituting Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), including direct 
negotiation ADR or ADR with the GAO’s negotiation assistance.  This 
strategy generally provides the protester a process-type relief, 
including reconsideration of agency decisions and explanation of 
agency decisions to the protester;   
4) making a formal protest defense through an agency report, which can 
take up to 100 days to obtain a GAO decision; and  
5) making a formal protest defense through agency report under an 
express option, which compresses adjudication timelines but can still 
take up to 65 days to obtain a GAO decision.   
Of these five strategies, Strategies 4 and 5 are the least cost effective and 
have the greatest potential for program disruption.  Both of these strategies will lead 
to payment of the protesters’ attorney fees and protest costs if the agency loses. 
To lessen disruption to the procurement program, Strategies 4 and 5 can be 
combined with overrides of mandatory stay from the initial filing stages.  Strategy 1 
can also be combined with an override if there is a concern that the GAO will take 
too long to rule on the dismissal; the success of Strategy 1 will have essentially the 
same effect as an override.  Strategies 2 and 3 do not require stay overrides 
because they provide for a speedy final resolution of a protest, either by the agency 
on its own or cooperatively by the agency and the protester (and, possibly, any 
intervenor). 
4. Available Relief in GAO Protests 
In Chart 6, an agency is faced with the option of providing or refusing to 
provide relief to the protester in whole or in part.   Relief as described in this chart 
can be provided following: (1) voluntary corrective action, (2) ADR (including GAO-
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on reconsideration) to sustain protest after filing of the agency report and full 
litigation on the regular 100-day schedule or on the express option 65-day schedule.   
 
Chart 6. GAO Protest Process (Recommended Relief) 
To begin with, the GAO will recommend that an agency reimburse protester 
for reasonable attorney fees and costs if an agency chose to defend the protest 
through litigation and file an agency report, and if the GAO recommended sustaining 
the protest in a formal decision or in GAO-assisted ADR.   This fee-shifting 
mechanism operates as an anti-dilatory penalty on the agency, and is imposed for 
failure to properly investigate the protest allegations and take voluntary corrective 
action prior to filing of the agency’s formal legal defense, the agency report.  Expert 
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Substantively, an agency generally can provide a protester with ten (10) types 
of relief, not including combinations, as described in the following paragraphs.   
The first through the third types of relief are available in pre-award protests, 
and will generally require additions to the procurement administrative lead time 
(PALT) and to program costs.  Under FAR Part 5, PALT for high-dollar, non-
commercial item, non-emergency acquisitions can be 45 days or longer.  This time is 
required to publish a stand-alone FAR Part 5 synopsis and solicitation.  The fourth 
through the tenth types of relief are available in post-award protests.  Those types of 
relief can also add to PALT and to program costs.  Program costs can include 
administrative reprocurement costs.  Thus, in addition to payment of the protester’s 
legal fees and increases in other program costs, an agency’s decision to litigate in 
defense against a protest can be expected to delay a major defense acquisition 
program by 110 days or more under the express option and by 145 days or more 
under the regular GAO schedule.  The last, tenth (10th) type of relief is available in 
pre-award or post-award protests.  It typically does not result in time delays or 
substantially increased program costs. 
The first type of relief an agency can provide involves issuing a new 
acquisition plan or strategy, including a new Request for Information or a new FAR 
Part 5 synopsis of proposed contract action.  Publication of a new stand-alone FAR 
Part 5 synopsis can add 15 or more days to PALT.   
The second type of relief an agency can provide involves issuing a new 
solicitation, such as a new Request for Proposals, Invitation for Bids, or Request for 
Quotations.  Issuing a new stand-alone solicitation can add 30 or more days to 
PALT. 
The third type of relief an agency can provide is a new evaluation of a 
protester excluded from the competitive range.  This, too, can add time to PALT.  All 
of these types of relief also involve new administrative costs required to administer 
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The fourth type of relief involves termination of the protested contract award 
(held by the protester’s competitor that may have been a third-party intervenor in the 
protest).  This type of relief can add 45 or more days to PALT. Typically, an agency 
may choose to refuse to provide termination relief if the contract has been 
substantially performed.  Substantial performance typically occurs if the procurement 
has not been subject to stay, either because the protester missed the filing deadline, 
triggering mandatory stay, or because an agency overrode the stay based on 
grounds of the best interests of the United States and/or urgent and compelling 
circumstances significantly affecting the interests of the United States.   
The fifth type of relief involves re-awarding the contract by means of direct 
award to the protester.  If the protester is a small business, a joint venture or team of 
small businesses, or a mentor-protégé joint venture between large and small 
businesses, and the protester was bypassed from the award for responsibility or 
capacity reasons, direct award relief may be conditioned on a satisfactory Certificate 
of Competency from the Small Business Administration.  The direct award type of 
relief is generally rare.  It is typically proper only in post-award protests, and only if 
the protester is the only other offeror that is eligible for a lawful award if the protested 
impropriety or illegality had not taken place.  If other offerors may also have been 
eligible for the award if the protested impropriety or illegality had not taken place, this 
type of relief is improper, even if the protester is so far the best of all eligible offerors.  
The fact that the protester must have had substantial chance of receiving the award 
as a jurisdictional standing requirement in bid protest cases does not mean that 
other offerors may not benefit from a legal and proper source selection procedure.    
If an agency chooses not to provide termination relief, the agency may 
provide the sixth type of relief, refraining from exercising options in a contract.  
Generally, this relief is chosen when performance during the base period of the 
contract advanced far ahead and the legal violation at issue is not severe enough to 
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relief must generally be provided in conjunction with the seventh type of relief, the 
award of bid and proposal costs.   
The seventh type of relief, bid and proposal costs, can also be recommended 
by the GAO as stand-alone relief.  Agencies often prefer this type of relief as 
voluntary corrective action because it involves the least disruption to agency policies 
and to the program in question.    
The eighth type of relief involves re-evaluation of the protester and other 
offerors (including the incumbent awardee).  This is a common type of relief.  It is 
attractive to the agencies because of the perception that it is fair to all offerors, 
including the protester and the incumbent awardee, and that it allows the agency to 
obtain better value.  If an agency simply deviated from the stated evaluation criteria, 
this relief may involve re-evaluation based solely on the offers already submitted.  If 
the agency evaluated based on legally or factually improper evaluation criteria, this 
relief may involve requiring offerors to amend parts of their offers.  This relief would 
typically extend PALT and program costs, and it is typically recommended in 
conjunction with termination of the incumbent awardee’s contract.   
The ninth type of relief involves recompetition of the procurement.  This is 
also a common and attractive type of relief for the same reasons as the post-award 
re-evaluation.  The difference between the post-award re-evaluation and the post-
award recompetition is that in the post-award recompetition, the offerors may be 
required to submit new offers in response to a new solicitation.  This relief can 
saddle the agency with substantial reprocurement costs and extend its PALT by 45 
days or more, and will likely be recommended in conjunction with bid and proposal 
costs and termination of the incumbent’s contract.   
Agencies must take into account that the GAO will recommend termination, 
recompetition, or re-award of the protested award whenever (1) an agency chose to 
invoke only a best-interests override, and (2) the GAO recommended sustaining the 
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specifically required to make this recommendation regardless of any impact of cost 
or disruption from the recommendation.  This requirement operates as a penalty to 
ensure that agencies do not elevate their programmatic interests over the 
Congressionally established interest of the United States in full and open 
competition as set forth in the CICA.    
The last, tenth, type of relief involves declaratory relief, such as a change to 
agency policy.  This relief is attractive to established contractors and offers minimal 
time and cost impacts on agencies.  It does involve change to agency actions in 
future contracts. 
The relief recommended by the GAO is in the nature of non-binding 
recommendations.  If the GAO recommends sustaining the protest as part of GAO 
outcome prediction, the agency must promptly make a decision on what corrective 
action/relief it wants to take.  At this stage, the agency retains greater flexibility in 
choosing its corrective action (except for payment of the protester’s legal fees) than 
after a formal GAO opinion.  For example, an agency that is faced with a GAO 
sustain decision may be able to opt for payment of bid and proposal costs at the 
outcome prediction stage, instead of risking a recompetition, re-evaluation, or re-
award recommendation in a formal GAO opinion.  However, agencies are well-
advised to include declaratory or other relief (such as change in agency policies) to 
any corrective action at the outcome prediction stage in order to prevent recurrence 
of policies or practices that give rise to protests.  Declaratory or other relief can 
assure the protester that it will fare better in future procurements and, therefore, 
reduce the risk that the protester will take its grievances to the Court of Federal 
Claims in order to obtain more relief.  
On the other hand, if the GAO issues a formal sustain decision, an agency 
has 60 days from the date of the decision to decide whether to follow GAO 
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Historically, agencies have usually followed GAO recommendations.  
However, each agency must decide whether to follow any GAO recommendations in 
any particular case.  The U.S. Court of Federal Claims requires agencies to make an 
independent, reasonable determination, based on applicable law and facts, of 
whether to follow GAO recommendations issued as part of a decision or outcome 
prediction, instead of blindly following GAO recommendations.  Even though the 
Court of Federal Claims and the GAO are both in the Legislative Branch, the GAO’s 
views are not binding on the Court of Federal Claims.  Rather, the GAO’s views are 
treated by the Court merely as persuasive expert opinions.  Further, the predecessor 
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Court of Federal Claims 
expressly recognized that the GAO may make its recommendations based on the 
GAO’s own policy agenda for improving competitive procurement that goes beyond 
the requirements of procurement laws.  Contrary to misperceptions by some 
agencies, scrupulous adherence to deficient or policy-driven GAO recommendations 
does not immunize an agency’s procurement from future protests.  Rather, the Court 
requires agencies to make contracting decisions on the whole record, including the 
record of proceedings before the GAO.  If an agency believes that GAO 
recommendations are wrong or otherwise detrimental to the interests of the United 
States, that agency may choose not to follow GAO recommendations.  The agency 
is actually required by the Court of Federal Claims not to follow the GAO 
recommendations if the GAO recommendations are illegal.   
An agency has three options when faced with GAO recommendations: (1) 
agree to fully follow the GAO recommendations, (2) disagree with the GAO 
recommendations in whole or in part and take no further action, or (3) disagree with 
the GAO recommendations in whole or in part and request a binding legal opinion 
supporting its position from the Office of Legal Counsel within the U.S. Department 
of Justice and/or request formal guidance supporting its position from the Office of 
Federal Procurement Policy within the White House Office of Management and 
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Option 1 creates the risk of protest litigation at the Court of Federal Claims by 
the incumbent, while Options 2 and 3 create the risk of protest litigation at the Court 
of Federal Claims by the offeror or potential offeror that was the protester at the 
GAO level.  Options 2 and 3 enable the agency to avoid all or some of the costs and 
delays resulting from implementing GAO recommendations.  However, Options 2 
and 3 also create the risk of Congressional actions against the agency.  Under the 
CICA, the GAO will report to Congress any refusal to follow its recommendations.  
The GAO also must recommend whether Congress should correct inequity or 
protect procurement integrity by private relief legislation, legislative rescission or 
cancellation of funds, further Congressional investigation, or some other action.    
5. Protests at the Agency Level 
Agency-level protests are authorized by Executive Order 12,979 and 
implemented in FAR Sections 33.102 and 33.103.  As shown in Chart 7, the process 
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Chart 7. Agency-Level Protest 
Prior to the agency-level protest, E.O. 12,979 requires that both the protester 
and the contracting officer resort to negotiations: “all parties shall use their best 
efforts to resolve concerns at the contracting officer level through ‘frank 
discussions.’”  An agency-level protest is advantageous for the agency from a 
reputational standpoint, because resolution can take place within the agency and a 
published decision is not required.  For this reason, an excluded offeror or potential 
offeror often chooses to file an agency-level protest as a matter of good customer 
relations.  However, an agency-level protest does not extend time for obtaining a 
stay at the GAO and no automatic stay is available for appeals of unsuccessful 
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negotiate an agency’s agreement to impose a voluntary stay during any appeals 
within the agency or any subsequent protests at the GAO.    
Agency-level protests may be filed either at the contracting officer level or at 
some level above the contacting officer, depending on agency regulations. 
A protest challenging improper solicitations or acquisition strategies is filed 
prior to the due date for bid opening or proposal submission.  Protests in all other 
cases are filed not later than 10 days after the protest grounds are known or should 
have been known, whichever is earlier.  Just like the GAO with respect to its own 
timeliness limits, agencies may waive these timeliness requirements.   
If a protest is received before award (including a protest of exclusion from the 
competitive range), the procurement is subject to a mandatory stay such that the 
agency cannot make an award.  To reduce costs or time delays resulting from 
mandatory stay, the agency can override the mandatory stay on the grounds of (1) 
“urgent and compelling circumstances,” and/or (2) best interests of the United 
States.  Unlike in protests at the GAO, there is no requirement for the best interests 
override that the agency intend to make an award within 30 days.  The agency’s 
ability to obtain an override depends on whether the agency is able to obtain 
extensions of acceptance deadlines from all offerors. 
If a protest is received after an award, the procurement is subject to a 
mandatory stay provided the protest was filed within 10 days from the date of notice 
or, in case of mandatory debriefing request, 5 days from the first date offered for 
debriefing.  An excluded offeror has 3 days from the notice of award to request a 
mandatory debriefing.  Agency must provide a mandatory debriefing within 5 days of 
the award decision if requested within 3 days of the notice.  If an excluded offeror 
does not request a debriefing, the offeror has 10 days from the date of the notice of 
award to file a protest in order to obtain a mandatory stay.  If an excluded offeror 
waits beyond 3 days from the date of the notice to ask for debriefing, agency is not 
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debriefing.  Again, an excluded offeror has 10 days from the date of notice to file a 
protest in order to obtain a mandatory stay.   
If an excluded offeror requested debriefing within 3 days of notice of award, 
such debriefing is mandatory.  An excluded offeror must file a protest within 5 days 
of first date offered by the agency for mandatory debriefing in order to obtain a 
mandatory stay.   
If an excluded offeror waits beyond 10 days from the date of notice or, in the 
case of a mandatory debriefing request, 5 days from the first date offered for 
debriefing, an agency may impose a discretionary stay.       
To reduce costs or time delays resulting from a mandatory stay, the agency 
can override the mandatory stay on the grounds of (1) “urgent and compelling 
circumstances,” and/or (2) best interests of the United States.  The agency’s ability 
to secure an override on the “best interests” grounds depends on whether the 
protester is an incumbent contractor.  If the protester is an incumbent contractor, the 
agency must decide whether to place a bridge contract extending the incumbent’s 
performance.  Only if the agency does not place a bridge contract will it be able to 
assert the best interests override.     
Consistent with direction in the FAR 33.103 and Executive Order 12,979, 
agencies are obligated to provide for “inexpensive, informal, procedurally simple, 
and expeditious resolution of protests.”  Agencies are also directed to utilize 
alternative dispute resolution techniques (ADR), including third party neutrals and 
personnel from other agencies.   
An agency is required to use its best efforts to make a decision within 35 days 
of the filing of the protest.  There is no required discovery, although information 
exchanges between parties are authorized.  
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If an agency makes an adverse decision, the mandatory stay expires.  A 
protester may appeal the adverse decision within if allowed by agency procedures.  
An agency may provide for a voluntary or discretionary stay while the appeal is 
pending.   
A protester may file a protest at the GAO or the Court of Federal Claims 
following an agency-level protest (with or without an appeal within the agency).   
If a protester files first at the agency level and the resolution is unsuccessful, 
the protester risks losing the ability to obtain a stay during the subsequent GAO 
protest.  As stated previously, an agency-level protest does not extend time for 
obtaining a stay at the GAO.  However, an agency may agree to impose a 
discretionary stay in future GAO protests.  An agency-level protest does not affect 
stays at the Court of Federal Claims.   
Least Disruptive/Most Cost-Effective Strategies: The least disruptive/most 
cost-effective strategies at this stage of the procurement process involve  
1) taking early corrective action, especially on a pre-award protest.  
However, early corrective action in agency-level protests may not be 
most cost-effective.  If the protester receives a cash settlement or a 
subcontract at a higher price than the originally selected contractor or 
contractor team, this could result in higher costs for the agency;   
2) entering into a prior agreement with a potential protester that the 
agency will continue the stay of the procurement during the pendency 
of the protest at the GAO in order to encourage disappointed bidders 
to take their protests to the agency.  This strategy is valid only if the 
procurement is not time sensitive and if the agency intends to achieve 
resolutions with the consent of the protester; and 
3) providing greater transparency into the procurement process and into 
the agency’s reasoning and decision-making as part of the agency-
level protest.     
Overall, agency-level protest is the least disruptive/most cost-effective 
resolution strategy of any bid protests.  The agency must use its best efforts to make 
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beyond the initial agency decision.   An agency may also issue an override of the 
stay.  This is also the least paperwork-intensive protest resolution process.  
Discovery/productions of documents and depositions of contracting officers are not 
required in agency-level protests.   
Disappointed bidders are not required to file at the agency level.  However, 
agency-level protests are particularly advantageous to protesters at the acquisition 
planning or solicitation (RFP/IFB/RFQ) stage because the agency is in a position to 
easily make changes to the acquisition strategy.  If the agency immediately takes 
corrective action, it may also avoid paying the protester’s legal fees.  At the same 
time, agency-level protests are the least disruptive for the agency because agency-
level protests do not toll the time for mandatory stay at the GAO.  If the agency 
makes an adverse decision, the protester cannot obtain the stay in any subsequent 
GAO protest unless it met the GAO’s timeliness rules.   
6. Protests in the Court of Federal Claims 
As shown in Chart 8, a protester files a protest in the United States Court of 
Federal Claims under the authority of the Tucker Act (2010), 28 U.S.C. §1491(a) or 
(b), and the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
[COFC], 2011).  Once a protest is filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, the 
Justice Department assumes full authority to litigate or settle the case on behalf of 
the United States government.  The procuring agency loses formal control of the 
matter under litigation, such that its views become merely advisory and its lawyers 
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Chart 8. Court of Federal Claims Protest 
Under subsection 1491(a), bid protests are traditionally considered by the 
Court as claims for breach of an implied-in-fact contract between the government 
and the protester to fairly consider the protester’s proposal.  Successful protests 
brought under this theory result in so-called remedies at law, such as monetary relief 
for bid and proposal costs, declaratory relief, and remand of the matter to the 
agency.  Injunctive relief, such as stay of the procurement, re-evaluation, 
recompetition, or re-award of the contract, is not authorized under subsection 
1491(a).  Congress subsequently enacted subsection 1491(b), which authorized the 
Court to grant “any relief the Court considers proper, including declaratory and 
injunctive relief except that any monetary relief shall be limited to bid preparation and 
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under this subsection, the courts shall give due regard to the interests of national 
defense and national security and the need for expeditious resolution of the action.”  
Section 1491(b) authority is implemented in Appendix C of the Rules of the Court of 
Federal Claims (U.S. Court of Federal Claims [COFC], 2011), Procedures in 
Procurement Protest Cases Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1491(b).  Protesters typically 
assert jurisdiction under both subsections, such that Appendix C procedures apply.   
A protest at the Court of Federal Claims begins, save for exceptional 
circumstances, with an advance pre-filing notice from the protester to the agency’s 
contracting officer, the Court, the Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division, 
U.S. Department of Justice, and any apparently successful offeror.  The protester’s 
notice, due at least 24 hours prior to the filing of the protester’s complaint, must state 
whether the protester intends to seek discretionary judicial stay of the procurement 
during the pendency of the case in the form of temporary or preliminary injunctive 
relief, whether the stay was discussed with the Justice Department, and whether the 
GAO already ruled on the matter.  The notice procedure is designed to ensure that 
the Justice Department’s counsel becomes familiar with the procurement enough to 
be able to address the adequacy of the remedies and the desirability of voluntary 
stay of the procurement during the initial status conference.  The notice procedure 
encourages the protester and the Justice Department to discuss the matter and, 
through negotiations, avoid the need for a judicial order to stay the procurement 
while the case is pending (but not necessarily a voluntary stay).     
Following the pre-filing notice, the protester files a complaint and any 
appropriate related material with the Court.   
As soon as practicable after the filing of the complaint, the Court schedules 
an Initial Status Conference with the parties.  Typically, the Conference is held within 
one or few days from the filing of the Complaint. 
Prior to the Conference, the Justice Department and the agency must 
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temporary or preliminary injunction/stay.  A voluntary stay may be advisable if 
moving forward with contract award and performance would result in greater costs to 
the agency in case the Court issues final injunctive relief than if the agency waited to 
proceed with the acquisition before the Court issues final injunctive relief.  Neither 
voluntary nor judicial stay is necessary if the protester and the government agree 
that remedies at law, such as bid and proposal costs and/or declaratory relief, are 
adequate.  The government will avoid an injunction whenever it can establish to the 
Court’s satisfaction that (1) the protester is not likely to succeed on the merits of the 
allegations that the agency action was illegal, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion; (2) the protester will not suffer irreparable injury without injunctive relief; 
(3) the balance of hardships favors the government; and (4) an injunction would be 
contrary to the public interest, including considerations of national defense or 
national security.   
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) can be conducted between the parties 
at any time during the Court of Federal Claims protest.  The parties can request 
assistance of the Court of Federal Claims with ADR at the Initial Status Conference 
or thereafter, or the Court may direct the parties to engage in ADR on its own 
initiative.   
If the government agrees to a voluntary stay of the procurement, it can so 
advise the Court during the Initial Status Conference.  The Court will establish a 
schedule for further proceedings, and the government can then proceed with its 
filings, such as any Motions to Dismiss, an Answer, a Motion for Judgment on 
Administrative Record, any trial filings, and any Motions for Sanctions under Rule 11 
of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (COFC, 2011).   
If the government does not agree to a voluntary stay, then the Court will 
address the need for temporary or preliminary injunction, or stay, during the Initial 
Status Conference.  Under Rule 65 of the Court of Federal Claims, an injunctive stay 
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A temporary injunction (also known as a Temporary Restraining Order or 
TRO) may be issued without notice to the government as an immediate, short-term 
stay for the purpose of protecting the protester from “immediate, irreparable injury, 
loss, or damage” that can result until the government’s position concerning the stay 
can be heard.  To mitigate delays, the government may file a Motion to Dissolve the 
Temporary Injunction on two (2) days notice to the protester.  
On the other hand, a preliminary injunction may be issued only upon notice to 
the government and upon a hearing where the government is given an opportunity to 
be heard concerning the stay.  A preliminary injunction lasts during the entire 
pendency of the case until the Court renders its final decision.  Under Rule 65, the 
Court may, at its initiative or the request of any party, consolidate the hearing on the 
preliminary injunction with the proceedings on the merits of the protest.       
The Rules of the Court of Federal Claims (COFC, 2011) give the government 
a fiscal incentive to oppose any voluntary or judicial stay during the pendency of the 
case if the government is confident in its legal position.  Specifically, if the Court 
grants a temporary or a preliminary injunction, the protester must post with the Court 
a bond or other security pursuant to Rules 65 and 65.1.  The bond must be in an 
amount that the Court will determine to be proper to compensate the government if it 
is later determined to be wrongfully restrained. The government will be able to 
collect on that bond if it prevails. 
Next, the government must file an Answer to the Complaint within 60 days 
from the date of the filing of the complaint, and may file a Motion to Dismiss under 
Rule 12 prior to filing an Answer to the Complaint.  The Motion to Dismiss may be 
made on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or failure to join a necessary party.  
Additional pleadings may be filed.  Following the filing of the Answer, any party may 
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At the time of the filing of the Answer or the Motion to Dismiss, or at any time 
thereafter, the government (or the protester) may also file a Motion for Sanctions 
under Rule 11.  The Court may assess Rule 11 sanctions on its own initiative.  Rule 
11 is the Court’s primary authority to penalize false, frivolous, and vexatious claims, 
defenses, and arguments.  Under Rule 11(b), any lawyer or unrepresented party 
certifies to the Court, by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating any paper or 
motion, that 
1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, 
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; 
3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of 
information. 
If the Court determines that the certification was false, Rule 11 allows 
sanctions  
limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable 
conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include 
nonmonetary directives [such as a restriction on filing future cases in 
the Court]; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on 
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing 
payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees 
and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.  
  
Rule 11 sanctions are not available against the parties for their lawyer’s legal 
frivolous arguments.  Also, the Court cannot initiate Rule 11 sanctions on its own 
after the parties settle their claims and the protest is voluntarily dismissed.  
If the Court grants the government’s Motion to Dismiss, the case is closed 
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the protester’s bond of costs incurred by the agency due to the procurement stay if 
there was a temporary or preliminary injunction.  Further, under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (1980), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and Rule 54, the government may seek 
recovery of costs and legal fees.  At that time, the government may also obtain 
sanctions against the protester under Rule 11 of the Court of Federal Claims 
(COFC, 2011).  The protester may appeal the dismissal and any sanctions to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within 60 days.     
If the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss, the government’s next opportunity 
to get the protest dismissed comes when the government files a Motion for 
Judgment on the Administrative Record (MJAR).  The protester may oppose this 
motion, or file its own Cross-Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (C-
MJAR).   
If the Court grants the government’s MJAR and denies the protester’s C-
MJAR, the protest is dismissed.  The final judgment may include recovery from the 
protester’s bond of costs incurred by the agency due to procurement stay if there 
was a temporary or preliminary injunction.  Further, under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (1980), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and Rule 54 (COFC, 2011), the government 
may seek recovery of costs and legal fees.  At that time, the government may also 
obtain sanctions against the protester under Rule 11 of the Court of Federal Claims 
(COFC, 2011).  The protester has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit within 60 days from the date of the entry of final judgment.   
If the Court does not grant either the protester’s or the government’s MJARs 
in their entirety, the protest proceeds to trial on any issues that were not resolved by 
the Court’s ruling on the MJARs.   
If the Court denies the government’s MJAR and grants the protester’s C-
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If the protest proceeds to trial, the Court either sustains or denies the protest.  
If the Court denies the protest, the case is dismissed.  The final judgment may 
include recovery from the protester’s bond of costs incurred by the agency due to 
the procurement stay if there was a temporary or preliminary injunction.  Further, 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and Rule 54, the 
government may seek recovery of costs and legal fees.  At that time, the 
government may also obtain sanctions against the protester under Rule 11 of the 
Court of Federal Claims.  The protester has the right to appeal to the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit within 60 days from the date of the entry of final 
judgment.  If the Court sustains the protest, the Court proceeds to the awarding of 
relief. 
The relief awarded by the Court of Federal Claims may include, (1) based on 
factors generally applicable to injunctive relief, a permanent injunction in the nature 
of an order directing the government to recompete, re-evaluate, or re-award the 
contract, or to issue a new acquisition plan or solicitation; (2) declaratory relief, 
where the Court rules that agency violated the Constitution, a law, regulation, or 
Executive Order; and (3) bid and proposal costs, if the Court due to national security 
or other applicable factors, declined to award a permanent injunction, or if 
permanent injunction is not possible due to substantial performance.  Further, under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and Rule 54, the protester may 
be awarded costs.  If the protester is an eligible small entity, it may also be awarded 
legal costs and fees, unless the Court finds that the government’s position was 
substantially justified or the circumstances make the award unjust.  If warranted, a 
protester may also at this time obtain Rule 11 sanctions against the government.  
The government may appeal the grant of relief to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit within 60 days from the date of entry of the final judgment.    
Least Disruptive/Most Cost Effective Strategies: The least disruptive/most 
cost-effective strategies at the Court of Federal Claims involve  
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2) refusing to agree to voluntary stays, aggressively opposing temporary 
injunctions or preliminary injunctions, and insisting on the protester 
posting a bond to compensate the government for the costs of any 
delays pertaining to injunctions.  This stage may be substituted for 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) or voluntary corrective action by 
the agency;  
3) if a preliminary injunction is granted, seeking of expedited filings and 
decision on the Motion for Judgment on Administrative Record and on 
any trial.  This stage may be substituted for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) or voluntary corrective action by the agency;  
4) if the government prevails on the merits, aggressively requesting Rule 
11 sanctions for frivolous or dilatory protests;  
5) if the government prevails on the merits, arguing for declaratory relief 
and reimbursement of legal and proposal costs, rather than a 
permanent injunction affecting the procurement program; if the 
government loses on the merits, entering into an ADR settlement as to 
remedies.  Unlike the protest process at the GAO, the agency cannot 
disregard any relief to the protester ordered by the Court. 
7. Summary of Major Prevention and Resolution Tools in Different 
Protest Forums 
a. Use of Stay Overrides to Minimize Time Delays 
As FAR Subpart 33.1 indicates, a protest timely filed at the GAO or agency 
results in a mandatory stay of the procurement or proposed procurement.  Agencies 
can also impose discretionary stays.  The government can override a mandatory 
stay only based on “urgent and compelling circumstances which significantly affect 
the interest of the United States [that] will not permit waiting for the GAO’s decision” 
or based  on the “best interests of the United States” (FAR, 2010, § 33.104).  When 
the Court of Federal Claims reviews the validity of the override, it must take national 
defense and national security considerations into account under the Tucker Act 
(2010).  
At the agency level, a stay override is available on both grounds during the 
first four procurement stages.  If the agency-level resolution is not satisfactory to the 
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well.  At the GAO, mandatory stays at the two first pre-award stages can be 
overridden only for urgent and compelling circumstances if the award is likely within 
30 days.  During the second and third stages, the 30-day requirement is not 
applicable and stays can be overridden for best interests.  If the protester is an 
incumbent denied a new award, the agency may be required to issue a bridge 
contract in lieu of an override.  A protester may go to the Court of Federal Claims to 
challenge the override of stay at the GAO or agency level.  However, successful stay 
overrides are also risky.  If an agency ultimately loses the protest after obtaining a 
stay override, and performance has been substantially completed, the agency’s total 
contract cost would increase because the GAO would likely recommend the agency 
to pay the protester its legal fees as well as its bid and proposal costs.  As required 
by its authorizing statute, the Court of Federal Claims provides greater deference to 
overrides and other agency procurement actions based on national defense or 
national security considerations (Schwartz & Manuel, 2010, p. 13). 
In contrast, protests filed at the Court of Federal Claims do not trigger 
automatic stays.  The Court may impose a stay through a Temporary Restraining 
Order or a Preliminary Injunction, or the government may agree to a voluntary stay 
in lieu of injunction.  They may avoid a stay by arguing that the protester is unlikely 
to succeed on the merits, the harm to the agency outweighs the harm to the 
protester, the public interest is served by allowing the procurement to continue, and 
the protester will not suffer irreparable injury without remedy.     
b. Use of Defensive Strategies to Minimize Time Delays and 
Costs 
In addition to stay overrides, agencies have five (5) choices of defensive 
strategies that may reduce or enlarge delays and costs from bid protests, depending 
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 The GAO dismisses the protest as frivolous, meritless, or outside of its 
jurisdiction (including one that is untimely or where prejudice is 
lacking). 
 The agency takes early voluntary corrective action and the protest is 
withdrawn. 
 ADR (as defined in the U.S. Department of Justice Electronic Guide to 
Federal Procurement ADR and cited in Appendix A) is utilized to 
resolve the protest and the protest is withdrawn. 
 The agency opts for formal litigation before the GAO by filing an 
agency report.  The GAO may issue a written opinion or conduct one 
of two special kinds of GAO ADR (negotiation assistance or outcome 
prediction).   
 The agency opts for expedited litigation by seeking an express option. 
The first three options enable agencies to achieve full resolution in fewer than 
30 days and avoid paying the protester’s legal fees.  Litigation under the fourth 
strategy can last the maximum of one-hundred (100) days, and under the fifth 
strategy, sixty-five (65) days.  The last two strategies allow the agency to secure 
GAO validation of the agency’s procurement decisions in the form of a favorable 
GAO opinion, but at the risk of having to pay the protester’s legal fees in the event of 
loss.  Upon receipt of a protest, the agency must determine how to defend against 
the protest.  If the agency believes that the protest is indeed frivolous, meritless, or 
outside of its jurisdiction, then it can seek summary dismissal from the GAO.  Barring 
such a dismissal from the GAO, the agency must then prepare to defend its 
procurement action before the GAO (possibly utilizing the express option), take 
voluntary corrective action, or utilize ADR.   
8. Use of ADR in Protests at the GAO and at the Agency Level to 
Minimize Time Delays and Costs 
As shown in Figure 5, there are essentially five decision points where an 
agency can influence the process.  As discussed earlier, an agency may seek 
dismissal from the GAO on grounds that the protest is either meritless, frivolous, or 
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pursue ADR.  Should an agency attempt to litigate a protest and lose, the agency 
may be responsible for paying “the successful protestor” the cost for “filing and 
pursing the protest, including attorney’s fees and counsel and expert witness fees” 
(GAO Bid Protest Regulations, 2010, 4 C.F.R. § 21.8(d)(1)).  While the exact costs a 
protestor may incur in filing a protest varies, in the past the GAO has recommended 
that agencies pay successful protestors payment in excess of $300,000 (GAO, 
2009b). Any government strategy or practice short of adjudication may result in the 
government not having to reimburse a successful protestor for the costs associated 
with filing the protests.  As a result, in addition to time, ADR has the potential to save 
the government money. 
 
Figure 5. Agency’s Protest Response 
ADR is far from a new concept.  In 1995, President Clinton issued Executive 
Order No. 12,979 mandating that agencies use “to the maximum extent 
practicable…the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques.”  Within the GAO, 
there are two ADR options available, negotiation assistance and outcome prediction 
(GAO, Office of General Counsel, 2008, p. 27).  Outcome prediction is the most 
common form of ADR employed by the GAO (Spriggs & Kidalov, 2003, p. 2).  
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report, it offers the greatest potential to reduce the delay a protest has on a 
particular acquisition.  Conversely, outcome prediction takes place only after all 
issues have been raised and an evidentiary hearing has taken place (Spriggs & 
Kidalov, 2003, p. 2), at which point the GAO attorney will advise the parties of the 
“likely outcome of the case” (GAO, Office of General Counsel, 2008, p. 27).  
Thus, the substantial difference between outcome prediction and the formal 
adjudication of a protest is merely the absence of a written decision by the GAO in 
the former.  In terms of minimizing delays to the acquisition process, it does not 
seem that outcome prediction is a very useful mechanism.  Outcome prediction 
serves to minimize the reputational damage to an agency or its official responsible 
for the procurement at issue, but does not prevent the same problem that led to the 
protest from occurring in the future. 
Only around 1% of GAO bid protests are resolved through the GAO’s ADR 
techniques.  Such miniscule utilization occurs despite tremendously high GAO ADR 
success rates.  In fiscal years 2001–2009, the GAO handled 1,146; 1,204; 1,352; 
1,485; 1,356; 1,326; 1,411; 1,652; and 1,989 bid protests, respectively (Gibson, 
2010; Gamboa, 2006).   
For FYs 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, 
respectively, alternative dispute resolution was used in 150 (with 84% 
of those protests being resolved through such ADR), 145 (84%), 120 
(92%), 123 (91%), 103 (91%), 91 (96%), 62 (85%), and 78 (78%) 
protests. (Schaengold, Guiffré, & Gill, 2009, p. 255)  
 
In FY 2009, ADR was used in 149 cases with a success rate of 93% (Gibson, 2010).   
As previously noted, another common form of ADR is agency-level protests, 
which are authorized by Executive Order 12,979 and implemented in FAR Sections 
33.102 and 33.103.   
At the Court of Federal Claims, ADR can be conducted between the parties at 
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assistance of the Court of Federal Claims with ADR at the Initial Status Conference 
or thereafter, or the Court may direct the parties to engage in ADR on its own 
initiative.   
D. Common Objections to the Use of ADR and Similar Tools; 
Benefits of ADR and Similar Tools in Resolving Protests, 
and Impact on Major Acquisition Programs 
1. Objections to ADR and Other Prevention and Resolution Tools 
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 (ADRA) provides that 
federal agencies “may” use ADR, but also allows federal agencies to decline to use 
ADR in six circumstances: (1) the agency needs to secure an authoritative 
precedent, (2) the agency needs to resolve significant issues of government policy, 
(3) the agency needs to maintain its policies and practices without deviation, (4) the 
matter in dispute has significant effect on non-parties to the ADR, (5) the agency is 
unable to secure full public records of ADR proceedings, or (6) the agency must 
preserve its continued jurisdiction over the matter so that it could alter the result 
achieved in ADR (ADRA, 2010, § 572(b)).  ADRA, however, does not specifically 
address ADR in bid protests and does not require agencies to formally justify the 
refusal to use ADR.  According to legal and professional literature, such as the 
Construction Law Handbook (Shaffer & Belanger, 1999, pp. 284–285) there are at 
least six reasons why ADR, as well as other flexible dispute prevention and 
resolution tools, are not commonly used in bid protests.  These reasons include (1) 
strict GAO time limits for filing leave no time for ADR; (2) mandatory overrides of 
procurement stays in GAO protests are difficult to obtain and sustain; (3) protesters’ 
counsel needs to access protected business or source selection information for 
proper prosecution of bid protests; (4) an agency needs the concurrence of all 
potential offerors to proceed to ADR; (5) an agency may want to obtain a definitive 
“seal of approval” for its acquisition strategy from the GAO; and (6) an agency will be 
compelled to follow GAO recommendations due to likely Congressional sanctions.  
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closer empirical and legal analysis, none of these objections justify agencies going 
along with bid protest litigation to the extent they currently do.    
2. Strict GAO Time Limits for Filing   
The first reason is the strict time limits for filing protests set forth in the GAO 
Bid Protest Regulations (2010) at Title 4, Section 21.2 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.  These time limits are not tolled for the conduct of ADR.  A typical GAO 
filing window for post-award protests ranges between 10 days from the date of 
award and as little as five days from the first date offered for debriefing, while pre-
award protests must generally be filed prior to the deadline for receipt of bids or 
proposals (Shaffer & Belanger, 1999, pp. 284–285).  However, this objection applies 
to preventive, pre-protest ADR only.  It does not exclude the possibility of parallel 
track (ADR and regular protest process) or short, intensive post-filing ADR within the 
first couple of weeks after filing.  Indeed, at the Federal Aviation Administration 
Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA), which uses a modified parallel 
track, ADR is emphasized as the default resolution process, and the formal ODRA 
decision is used as a second option only.  Protests submitted to ADR are resolved in 
an average of 24 days, almost three times more quickly than the 62 days required to 
resolve bid protests if final agency decision is sought (DoJ, 2008).    
Moreover, the “strict filing deadline” objection may be overcome by a 
voluntary pre-emptive stay during the 5–10 days time window for automatic stays at 
the GAO.  As authorized under FAR 33.102(d), this pre-emptive stay may be issued 
by the contracting officers if there is a likelihood of a protest and a delay is in the 
best interests of the United States.  As a result, the pre-emptive stay could remove 
the pressure to file some protests where the protester’s concerns are simple and 
limited in number, and could be resolved with a simple conversation with an agency 
decision-maker.  In more complicated situations, the protester could file, but the 
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3. Difficulties in Obtaining and Sustaining Mandatory CICA Stay 
Overrides 
The second reason for agencies not to short-circuit bid protest litigation is the 
purported difficulty in obtaining overrides of mandatory CICA stays within the 
agencies and of getting the U.S. Court of Federal Claims to sustain overrides of 
mandatory stays of procurements.  Of course, “an agency override of the automatic 
stay should very rarely, if ever, occur in an agency-level protest—as compared to an 
override involving a GAO protest—because of the short time period allowed for 
issuing protest decisions” (Schaengold, Guiffré, & Gill, 2009, p. 271).  
Although difficulties with obtaining and sustaining overrides are far from 
insurmountable, contracting officers seeking overrides face considerable paperwork 
burdens, multiple reporting requirements, and override considerations that are 
broad, vague, contradicting, and, possibly, political.  To obtain a mandatory stay 
override, the CICA (2010) at 31 U.S.C., § 3553, requires that the head of the 
procuring activity, on a non-delegable basis, makes written findings that an override 
meets the requisite statutory criteria: (1) in case of a pre-award protest, that an 
agency is likely to make the award within 30 days and that “urgent and compelling 
circumstances which significantly affect interests of the United States will not permit 
waiting for the decision”; and (2) in case of a post-award protest, that “performance 
of the contract is in the best interests of the United States” or “urgent and compelling 
circumstances that significantly affect interests of the United States will not permit 
waiting for the decision” of the GAO. Section 3553 also requires that the GAO be 
notified of the findings.   
FAR supplements and related procedures issued by the military departments 
impose additional bureaucratic constraints on override decisions.  For instance, the 
Air Force Mandatory Procedure (AFMP), § 5333.104 (2010), requires that override 
requests be signed by a general-level or a Senior Executive Service-level officer, 
and forwarded through a Senior Contracting Official to the Office of the Assistant 
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5133.104 (2010), requires the contracting officer to prepare a written Determination 
& Findings (D&F) document for the head of contracting activity’s signature, but also 
requires approval from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Procurement 
or the Army Materiel Command (AMC) Command Counsel.  Justifying overrides 
through those layers of bureaucracy constraints may well deter contracting officers 
from seeking stay overrides.  Unlike the Army and the Air Force, the Navy Marine 
Corps Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS) Subpart 5233.170 (2010) 
does not require multiple senior approval layers for overrides and does not set 
override standards.  It does require briefings to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Acquisition and Logistics Management on protested acquisitions over $1 
billion.  The Air Force and the Army may well consider following the Navy’s lead and 
reducing the levels of review required for stay overrides.  Instead, all services may 
require high-level review if contracting activities choose not to proceed with an 
override.  
However, military departments seeking overrides will benefit from deferential 
standards of review at the Court of Federal Claims when seeking to sustain the 
overrides.  As noted by Schaengold, Guiffré, and Gill (2009), “[t]he protester would 
have to show that the agency's override decision was arbitrary and capricious and 
the COFC affords substantial deference to the agency's decision, particularly if 
matters of national security are involved” (p. 287).  Specifically, the Tucker Act 
(2010), 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b), requires the COFC to “give due regard for the interests 
of national defense and national security and the need for expeditious resolution of 
the action” and “review the agency’s decision pursuant to the standards set forth in 
Section 706 of Title 5, known as the Administrative Procedure Act (2010), 5 U.S.C. § 
706.  As part of this review, the COFC will conduct a searching inquiry into the 
record to test the agency’s reasons for the override.  In general, overrides will be 
invalidated if they are based on cost savings to the agency or agency confidence in 
its legal position or the propriety of the award, or if the override displaces an 
incumbent or concerns procurement of information technology services (Sacilotto, 
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national security overrides are likely to be sustained (Sacilotto, 2009, p. 7).  Indeed, 
“where legitimate ‘interests of national defense and national security’ have been 
asserted and established to the court’s satisfaction, it is ‘not necessary’ for the court 
to reach the merits” of the override (Kropp Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 2005).  
However, AFARS (2010) § 5133.104 and AFMP (2010) § 5333.104 seemingly 
undermine this advantage by requiring contracting activities to consider factors 
presently considered extraneous by the COFC, such as the agency’s legal 
arguments for the validity of the award or Congressional interest in a protest, before 
seeking an override.   
Further, the court will likely decline to endorse a sole-source contract award 
to effect an override, and will require a bridge contract, extension, or multiple awards 
instead (Kropp Holdings, Inc. v. United States [63 Fed. Cl. 537], 2005).  The specific 
criteria that the court requires the agencies to consider are, unfortunately, still in flux 
because of conflicting COFC precedents (Kropp Holdings, Inc. v. United States [63 
Fed. Cl. 537], 2005).   
Moreover, it seems clear that COFC override precedents interpreting the 
CICA override provisions may be unreasonably tilted in favor of protesters bringing 
legally or factually weak cases.  For example, Federal agencies are apparently 
prohibited from considering whether they will likely prevail at the GAO, but must 
consider the potential of protesters prevailing at the GAO (Sacilotto, 2009, p. 5, 
citing Chapman Law Firm v. United States [67 Fed. Cl. 786, 2006], and E-
Management Consultants, Inc. v. United States [84 Fed. Cl. 1, 2008]).  The COFC 
historically declined to sustain overrides based on cost savings (at least based on 
low-value cost savings), but “might” allow agencies to justify overrides based on 
monetary losses without overrides (Sacilotto, 2009, p. 7).  In fact, the court’s 
precedents come very close to judicially creating a dollarized threshold range for 
permissible cost savings or financial losses to the government.  For instance, in 
Chapman Law Firm v. United States (67 Fed. Cl. 786, 2006), the COFC sustained 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 58 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Urban Development without the awardee’s real property marketing and management 
services, but in cases such as Nortel Government Solutions, Inc. v. United States 
(84 Fed. Cl. 243 [2008]) and Advanced Systems Development, Inc. v. United States 
(72 Fed. Cl. 25 [2006]), the COFC rejected override justifications based on cost 
savings that did not exceed $0.5 million per month.  Although the COFC is an Article 
I Congressional court, the issue of cost sufficiency or loss sufficiency for stay 
overrides seems a matter more appropriate for Congress itself to determine.  To 
reduce delays and costs from mandatory stays, criteria for review need to be 
clarified in statute or regulation in order to correct unbalanced COFC precedents in 
override cases.   
4. Protesters’ Need for Protected Information  
The third reason is that, unlike outside lawyers representing protesters, 
corporate decision-makers are generally excluded from admission to protective 
orders that allow lawyers to see source selection and confidential business 
information of other competitors (Shaffer & Belanger, 1999, pp. 284–85).  This 
objection may be taken care of during an early evaluation of the record with outside 
counsel subject to a protective order who can determine the significance of 
competitors’ source selection and confidential information.  Outside counsel typically 
prepare redacted versions of all protest filings that are provided to corporate 
executives under GAO bid protest regulations in Title 4, Sections 21.1 and 21.4 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, and the same regulations authorized the agency to 
withhold protected information even in the absence of a protected order.  Based on 
these regulatory provisions for redacted documents, it is reasonable to expect that 
corporate decision-makers should be able to participate in ADR sessions relying on 
materials redacted for confidential or source selection information.  These decision-
makers would be able to resolve disputes through ADR decisions based on high-
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5. Need for Awardee or Third-Party Participation and Concurrence; 
Desire to Obtain Seal of Approval of Agency Conduct so as to 
Prevent Awardee or Third-Party Protests  
The fourth and fifth reasons that the agency may refuse to engage in ADR are 
the sense that the awardee and all other third-party bidders or potential bidders must 
participate in ADR and must concur with any relief provided in ADR (Shaffer & 
Belanger, 1999, pp. 284–85).  Otherwise, the agency fears, the awardee or third 
party may effectively veto any ADR relief by filing a bid protest of their own.  For 
example, the awardee may file a protest challenging re-evaluation of their award or 
challenging the termination of their contract.  In some situations, there may be a 
potential for multiple potential protestors in addition to the awardee and the next-in-
line offeror, which creates a significant litigation risk. These objections have some 
intuitive appeal, but they are based on four false implicit premises:  
1) that unanimous consent from every potential protester, however 
remote, is required in order to achieve a valid, enduring ADR outcome;   
2) that the forum where most protests are filed, the GAO, can provide 
such a stamp of approval;  
3) that the GAO stamp of approval is worth the costs to the taxpayers and 
warfighters in terms of time and money; or  
4) that the protester will likely file in the forum which can issue a binding 
seal of approval, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.   
As to the first premise, the ADR process generally involves evaluation and 
consideration of any potential legal and factual arguments that may be raised by 
others as well as their ability to raise them.  Accordingly, third parties that have only 
remote likelihood of award would likely have no standing and their interests can 
receive corresponding treatment in ADR.  In terms of other potential protesters with 
standing, their ADR assertions should be evaluated and resolved by the agency on 
the totality of merits and circumstances, keeping in mind the agency’s obligation of 
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unanimous consent to an ADR outcome from all potential protesters with standing, it 
can still reach a valid and enduring ADR outcome.   
On the other hand, and as responsive to the second premise, if an agency 
refuses to pursue ADR in favor of obtaining a GAO decision, the agency will not be 
able to obtain the enduring seal of approval it seeks.  As a matter of law, the GAO is 
powerless to issue such a seal of approval because its opinions are legally 
nonbinding recommendations under the Competition in Contracting Act (2010).  As 
noted by the Congressional Research Service (Schwarts & Manuel, 2010), the Court 
of Federal Claims may find an agency “to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in 
abuse of discretion, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), by 
following GAO precedents or adopting GAO recommendations” (pp. 15–17).  For 
instance, in two 2007 cases, Geo-Seis Helicopters v. United States (77 Fed. Cl. 633 
[2007]), and Grunley Walsh International, LLC v. United States (78 Fed. Cl. 35 
[2007]), the Court of Federal Claims invalidated the agency’s decisions to follow the 
GAO where the GAO’s opinions were contrary to the plain meaning of statutes and 
regulations.  
As to the third premise, acquisition leadership of defense agencies must 
acknowledge that purchasing a stamp of approval from the GAO by effectively 
inviting or condoning a protest adjudication is a not a compelled necessity.  Rather, it 
is a choice with significant attendant costs and uncertain results—a choice that 
closely resembles gambling.  First, this choice produces uncertain results because 
the goals of the GAO review and of the relief recommended by the GAO are different 
in scope from the nature of the review and relief recommended by the Court.  As 
recognized by the Court of Claims since the 1960s case of John Reiner Co. v. 
United States (325 F.2d 438 [Ct. Cl. 1963]), 
Because of his general concern with the proper operation of competitive 
bidding in government procurement, ... [the Comptroller General, the head of 
the GAO] can make recommendations and render decisions that, as a matter 
of procurement policy, awards on contracts should be cancelled or withdrawn 
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minimal measure of legality but can sponsor and encourage the observance 
of higher standards by the procuring agencies. Courts, on the other hand, are 
restricted, when an invitation or award is challenged, to deciding the rock-
bottom issue of whether the contract purported to be made by the 
Government was invalid and therefore no contract at all—not whether another 
procedure would have been preferable or better attuned to the aims of the 
competitive bidding legislation. 
Second, this choice has significant costs in case the agency loses.  In a 2009 
opinion Public Communications Services, Inc.—Costs (GAO, 2009b), the GAO 
stated that it will recommend payments of attorney fees ranging from $185 to $750 
per hour, and legal support staff fees ranging from $110 to $275 per hour.  In that 
relatively low-profile case, the protester’s attorney fees for six lawyers (including four 
attorneys of record) easily exceeded $300,000.  By comparison, in the KC-X tanker 
protest, the winning protester, Boeing, was represented by 15 attorneys of record 
and, likely, many other supporting lawyers.  This means that the Air Force 
purchased a legally non-binding GAO decision highlighting the facts the Air Force 
should have known (e.g., belated changes in evaluation criteria and other errors) at 
the cost to the taxpayers in the neighborhood of $1 million in protester’s legal fees.  
To better control taxpayers’ dollars, there should be a process for making a 
conscious decision of whether the GAO seal of approval is worth that kind of 
expenditure of taxpayer dollars.  Moreover, the agency’s behavior inviting full-blown 
protest litigation at the GAO in the hopes of buying a GAO decision means a 
substantial expenditure of agency-legal resources.  
Third, the GAO decision is not binding on the protester (Schwartz & Manuel, 
2010, p. 15).  Although the number of COFC protests with previous GAO 
proceedings is small, such cases do happen.  In that case, the agency may have 
wasted both time and money “buying” a decision at the GAO.   
 As to the fourth premise, it is highly unlikely that the agency will be able to 
buy a binding seal of approval with a protest from the Court of Federal Claims.  The 
annual number of bid protests at the Court of Federal Claims is less than 1% of the 
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comparison with the COFC, the GAO is clearly the preferred forum for protesters.  It 
is, therefore, unlikely that an agency should count on obtaining a seal of approval 
from the COFC in the vast majority of protests.  Further, there are timeliness issues.  
In theory, a protest can be filed at the Court of Federal Claims within up to six (6) 
years from the date the grounds for the protest arose.  In practice, COFC protests 
are filed much sooner to avoid the defense of laches (i.e., that the protester was 
sleeping on his or her rights), but COFC protests are not subject to the GAO’s 
timeliness rules for filing.  Unlike the GAO, the COFC also has no cap on time by 
which it must make a decision.  Further, COFC protests can be appealed to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which also has no time limits on issuing 
decisions.      
6. Fear of Congressional Sanctions for Non-Compliance with GAO 
Recommendations in Bid Protests 
Federal agencies customarily follow the GAO because of concerns with 
Congressional sanctions.  Empirical evidence, however, does not support giving in 
to this fear blindly, at least in the case of military procurements.  In fiscal years 
1995–2009, there have been only six instances of Federal agencies refusing to 
follow GAO recommendations (Schwartz & Manuel, 2010, p. 16; Schaengold, 
Guiffré, & Gill, 2009, pp. 257–58).  Of those, two instances involved civilian agencies 
and four instances involved military agencies, as follows:  
1) Pemco Airplex, Inc. (GAO, 1998), involving an Air Force bundled 
procurement for logistics at the Sacramento Air Logistics Center;  
2) Rockwell Electronic Commerce Corp. (GAO, 2000), involving a Social 
Security Administration procurement for telecommunications services;  
3) Aberdeen Technical Services (GAO, 2000), involving an Army 
competitive sourcing procurement for management of base industrial 
operations;  
4) Consolidated Engineering Services (GAO, 2002), involving the 
Department of Defense competitive sourcing procurement for 
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5) Symplicity Corp. (GAO, 2003), involving an Office of Personnel 
Management procurement of services for the Federal employment 
services database USAJobs.gov; and  
6) Mission Critical Solutions (GAO, 2009a), involving the Army’s contract 
for informational technology (IT) support.   
This evidence shows that military agencies on average refuse to follow the 
GAO once every 3.5 years.  This evidence also shows that military buyers refused to 
follow the GAO on exactly zero protests related to major acquisition programs or any 
other kinds of programs for procurement of weapons, devices, or other supplies.   
Is this near-blind following of the GAO by contracting agencies warranted?  
Empirical evidence strongly suggests it is not.  There appears to be only one 
instance of publicly reported Congressional sanction for failure to follow the GAO 
recommendation (Schwartz & Manuel, 2010, p. 17, note 109).  The sanction 
involved a threat of project funding loss issued by the Chairman of the House 
Government Reform Committee to the Office of Personnel Management concerning 
a contract for an online federal employment database, USAJobs.gov.  There appear 
to have been no such threats reported by the Congressional Research Service or in 
scholarly literature against military agencies’ refusals to follow GAO 
recommendations.  On the contrary, in the recent case of Mission Critical Solutions 
(GAO, 2009a), the Army’s refusal was supported by policy directions and legal 
opinions from the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Legal Counsel 
within the Justice Department (Orszag, 2009; Rhee, 2009).  Unlike the GAO’s 
opinions, the Office of Legal Counsel’s opinions are “controlling on questions of law 
within the Executive Branch” (Bradbury, 2005).  Even though the Court of Federal 
Claims validated the GAO position, Congress apparently took the side of the 
agency.  In September 2010, Congress passed and the President signed the Small 
Business Jobs Act of 2010, Public Law 111-240.  Section 1347 of this law overruled 
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7. Benefits and Impact on Major Acquisition Programs   
As noted previously, protests usually involve a delay in either contract award 
or performance that can adversely impact the mission of the agency concerned.  A 
goal of ADR should be to minimize this delay.   
Literature review suggests that ADR could be particularly useful to resolve 
procedural issues and to prevent successful post-award protesters from obtaining 
untimely pre-award remedies of cancellation and resolicitation/recompetition.  For 
instance, when Unisys and General Dynamics protested the award of the $500 
million Information Technology Infrastructure Program (ITIP) contract, the 
Transportation Security Administration twice stopped the work because of indecision 
on whether the FAA ODRA or the GAO had jurisdiction to hear the protest 
(Wakeman, 2009).  The jurisdictional issue was addressed in the solicitation issued 
16 months prior to the award.  The GAO eventually asserted that it had jurisdiction to 
hear the protest.  The jurisdictional issue should have been resolved through ADR, 
since both the FAA and the GAO hear challenges to best value evaluations, and the 
agency could have moved on to resolving the merits of protest allegations.   
In three recent protests concerning major acquisition programs, protesters 
who brought post-award protests apparently sought or obtained untimely pre-award 
remedies.  For instance, in the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) protest, 
the protester BAE challenged the risk and capacity of its competitor, Oshkosh, 
because Oshkosh did not have the necessary facilities at the time of award and 
promised lower prices without backing them up with actual production experience 
(“FMTV 2010–2015,” 2010).  On the contrary, the protester BAE Systems recently 
invested in acquisition of Armor Holdings, a military truck manufacturer.  The GAO 
recommended a re-evaluation, but not resubmission of proposals or recompetition.  
As a result, the original award remained, but performance was substantially delayed.  
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In the Combat Search and Rescue-X (CSAR-X) helicopter procurement, the 
GAO recognized that the agency made a significant change in its intent to the 
procurement in both price and non-price aspects of the procurement and 
recommended proposal revisions, potential contract termination, and recommended 
payment of legal fees (“CSAR-X…,” 2009).  Although the CSAR-X program was 
eventually cancelled, the GAO decision was followed by multiple subsequent RFP 
revisions that had the effect of favoring or disfavoring some of the three potential 
helicopter models.  ADR should have facilitated an agreement on specifications that 
would have allowed the industry to compete and the agency to achieve full and open 
competition.   
In the KC-X tanker procurement, the mandatory stay and Boeing’s winning 
protest of the evaluation provided the momentum for a recompetition.  It also 
enabled Congress to hold hearings on time-barred, non-protestable pre-award 
issues, such as conformance of foreign government subsidies to EADS to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement and compliance 
of the Department of Defense with statutory requirements to consider the U.S. 
defense industrial base (10 U.S.C.  §§ 2501-2508 (2008)). ADR could have helped 
the Air Force to settle on the preferred design early on and conduct a competition on 
that basis.  Also, ADR would have helped the Air Force to identify and narrow down 
industrial base parameters in the solicitation.  
Further, the KC-X procurement was a prime candidate for mandatory stay 
override.  One such ground could have been military necessity to treat critical care 
patients, an issue affected by the poor reliability and suitability of current KC-135 
tankers that are also used for medical evacuations (Weinberger, 2010). The other 
ground could have been the significant financial losses to the government from 
ballooning maintenance costs.  According to the Congressional Research Service,  
The Air Force’s most comprehensive study of the KC-135 fleet is the KC- 
135 Economic Service Life Study (February 2001), which serves as the most 
appropriate baseline, and point of departure for considering the urgency of 
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and availability forecasts for the KC-135 fleet for the years 2001 through 
2040. It was conducted by a team of experts from throughout the Air Force 
and led by the Air Mobility Command (AMC). Regarding cost, the ESLS found 
that the KC-135 fleet would incur “significant cost increases” between 2001 
and 2040, but “no economic crisis is on the horizon”, “there appears to be no 
run-away cost-growth,” and “the fleet is structurally viable to 2040.”  . . . 
Following the ESLS publication, the Air Force planned to wait until 2013 to 
begin KC-135 replacement. (Gupta, Belasco, Else, & O’Rourke, 2003, pp. 2–
3)      
Admittedly, the narrative in the ESLS study does not appear to provide a 
compelling case for the GAO protest stay override.  The issue, however, is whether 
these significant, but not catastrophic, losses would have been legally sufficient 
under COFC precedents to sustain an override.  The answer to this question 
appears to be affirmative. The Air Force ESLS study projected maintenance cost 
increases (mainly to the airframe and engine) of about $40 billion over the period 
from 2001 through 2040 (Gupta, Belasco, Else, & O’Rourke, 2003, pp. 2–3).  This 
translates into average losses of approximately $25 million a year or a little over $2 
million a month.  This amount is much closer to the $3 million in monthly losses that 
justified an override in Chapman Law Firm v. United States (67 Fed. Cl. 786 [2006]) 
than the cost savings of under $0.5 million rejected by the COFC in Nortel 
Government Solutions, Inc. v. United States (84 Fed. Cl. 243 [2008]) and Advanced 
Systems Development, Inc. v. United States (72 Fed. Cl. 25 [2006]).  Thus, the Air 
Force could have issued a valid override, and that option could have been made 
widely known to the industry well in advance of the proposal due date.  In turn, the 
implicit threat of a valid override could have compelled the offerors to opt for an 
ADR, agency-level protest instead of lengthy, expensive post-award litigation at the 
GAO, or, at the very least, a pre-award GAO protest designed to secure a fair 
evaluation methodology and proper industrial base considerations in the solicitation.  
Yet, inexplicably, the Air Force failed to even attempt an override.  Instead of putting 
the industry on notice that an override might be issued and encouraging offerors to 
submit to ADR, the Air Force tanker buying office took to the trade press in a futile 
effort to complain about potential protests and the lack of sanctions on protesters 
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helped set the stage for delays, extensive Congressional pressure, and eventual 
recompetition.   
The best ADR and other resolution practices need to be identified and 
implemented by Federal agencies.  The Federal government has numerous 
examples of successful ADR programs.  Statutorily exempt from the federal 
acquisition system under the 1996 Department of Transportation (DoT) and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act (Public Law Number 104-50, § 347), the Federal 
Aviation Administration has developed its own set of procurement policies that 
include the use of ADR.  Similarly, in an effort to reduce the impact of protests, the 
United States Army Materiel Command (1997), implemented a comprehensive ADR 
program of its own, including agency-level protest under the agency-level protest 
authority.  A comparison of the FAA’s and AMC’s practices to those of the GAO 
process is presented in Chapter V. 
In order to gain insight into these practices and their use within various 
agencies, and to discover potential areas for improvement, a comprehensive survey 
of federal government acquisition and legal professionals was conducted.  The 
methodology employed and the corresponding results and analysis are reported in 
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III. Strategic Protests: Post-Award Bid 
Protests as Strategies to Maintain 
Competition in the U.S. Defense Industrial 
Base 
One possible reason for the difficulties in reducing bid protests is the issue of 
so-called strategic protests.  Anecdotal as well as statistical evidence suggests that 
the industry may be predisposed to use post-award protests as a proxy for 
addressing pre-award concerns about competition in the industrial base.  However, 
evidence also suggests that the government’s preference for contracting strategies 
that exclude or eliminate competition is what drives such strategic protests.  In 
general, neither the COFC, nor the GAO, nor the agencies will consider complaints 
about pre-award matters, such as allegations that an acquisition strategy has a 
negative impact on the U.S. defense industrial base or that a procurement 
solicitation improperly stifles full and open competition.  However, press reports 
concerning high-profile post-award bid protests suggest that industry protesters 
effectively achieved the remedy of total recompetition—which is normally used to 
correct pre-award violations. 
In the KC-X tanker protest case, the Air Force had the option “to ‘paper the 
record a little better’—adjusting the relative cost estimates of the two planes and fully 
briefing both parties as to where they stand so as to address its acknowledged 
errors—but without changing the final outcome” (Gates, 2008). Under Title 31, 
Section 3554 of the U.S. Code, the Air Force could have also refused to follow the 
GAO decision altogether.  The Air Force, however, chose neither course.  As a 
result, Congress took the opportunity to press the USAF on pre-award issues, 
“[a]side from technical matters such as the A330's higher fuel costs and higher 
maintenance costs,” including “alleged illegal Airbus subsidies, preserving the U.S. 
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jobs” (Gates, 2008). The Air Force subsequently cancelled the solicitation altogether 
and announced a total recompetition (Lyle, 2009).  
Similarly, one commentator argued that Navistar and BAE Systems recently 
protested the evaluation and award of the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 
(FMTV) contract to Oshkosh Corp. because of pre-award considerations, namely, 
the Army’s “winner-take-all” acquisition strategy that threatened to lock out major 
suppliers and drive them out of business: 
The GAO did not agree with all of the protesters’ points which included 
complaints that Oshkosh bid too low and could not meet that price as well as 
that they might not be able to ramp up production fast enough.  The GAO did 
say that the Army had to review its use of the award criteria but did not agree 
on the price issue.  The Army will now probably go back and write up how it 
did apply the source selection factors properly and try to justify the award to 
Oshkosh.  It is hard to believe that they will redo the competition and award it 
to one of the losing firms.  Several months have already been lost due to the 
protest.  Unfortunately that does not help BAE or Sealy who need the contract 
to build the FMTV.  BAE Systems spent several billion dollars on investing in 
its U.S. subsidiary and the loss of that contract will harm their U.S. revenue 
and profit.  Sealy is in even worse shape as without the FMTV plant running 
the city’s economy will be seriously harmed.  Of course the Wisconsin 
economy will grow as the work is moved there.  That unfortunately is the 
problem right now with these large, single winner defense contracts.  There 
often is no work to make up for losing the contract. That is why protests are 
prevalent and why companies fight hard for these contracts. (Potter, 2009) 
When Oshkosh won the recompetition, another commentary suggested that 
the award might be subject to Congressional intervention on industrial base grounds:   
[With an Oshkosh win,] production would mostly take place on the 
firm’s existing campus in Oshkosh, WI, with some sub-contracting to 
current subcontractors.  That kind of concentration generally improves 
price and efficiency numbers, but lowers political leverage.  The other 
potential political strike is the “industry consolidation” card, which notes 
the risks of placing all medium and heavy truck production (Army’s 
FMTV & FHTV [Family of Heavy Tactical Vehicles], USMC’s MTVR & 
LVSR [U.S. Marine Corps’ Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement and 
Logistic Vehicle System Replacement]) with one supplier and, for the 
most part, one campus.  Oshkosh’s response is to cite the number and 
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Protected Vehicles] and JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle] programs, 
and to state their belief that there has been a fundamental industry 
change over the past few years.  (“FMTV 2010–2015,” 2009) 
 
BAE Systems, the losing incumbent, subsequently mounted a lobbying campaign in 
Congress to address Oshkosh’s “monopoly on the military truck business” (Tiron, 
2009).  In effect, successful bid protests create a momentum and a window of 
opportunity for the defense industry to force re-consideration of acquisition strategies 
with a view towards maximizing competition and diversification in the U.S. defense 
industrial base. 
Compelling evidence reported on the www.USASpending.gov database 
substantiates the anecdotal commentaries that protests are the industry’s reaction to 
drastically decreasing competition, increasing consolidation, and decreasing support 
for the industrial base in DoD procurements. (OMB, n.d.)  For instance, between 
FY2009 and FY2001, contracts competed “within a limited pool” increased from 
about 13% to about 25% of total contract spending, and more than tripled in 
absolute dollar value from about $19 billion to about $65 billion.  Contracts “not 
competed for an allowable reason” increased from 30–34%, or doubled from about 
$44 billion to about $88 billion.  Contracts in the category “Everyone could compete, 
but only one offer was received” increased from 5–7%, more than doubling from 
about $7 billion to about $18 billion.  Tables 1–9 show total spending in each of 
these contract categories for FY2001–2009, and Table 10 provides definitions for 
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Table 1. FY2009 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts  
 
 Available for everyone for competition $71,862,341,259
 Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $18,149,089,194
 Competition within a limited pool $65,212,283,764
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the 
next one could be competed) 
$168,159,455 
 Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $13,786,272,712
 Not competed for an allowable reason $88,031,165,945
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Table 2. FY2008 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts  
 
 
Available for everyone for competition $134,316,760,171
 
Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $27,640,279,731
 
Competition within a limited pool $87,873,646,604
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the next one 
could be competed) 
$1,069,180,319
 
Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $18,284,622,369
 
Not competed for an allowable reason $122,604,742,440
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Table 3. FY2007 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts  
 
 
Available for everyone for competition $105,617,742,863
 
Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $25,137,524,349
 
Competition within a limited pool $77,195,109,770
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the next 
one could be competed) 
$1,086,111,576
 
Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $17,016,769,180
 
Not competed for an allowable reason $106,861,223,201
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Table 4. FY2006 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts  
 
 
Available for everyone for competition $94,428,740,635
 
Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $26,365,442,157
 
Competition within a limited pool $65,971,434,913
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the next one 
could be competed) 
$3,613,655,111
 
Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $15,326,201,680
 
Not competed for an allowable reason $93,674,689,317
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Table 5. FY 2005 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts  
 
 
Available for everyone for competition $90,383,471,507
 
Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $24,917,799,855
 
Competition within a limited pool $54,611,598,609
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the next one 
could be competed) 
$4,737,502,186
 
Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $15,356,195,590
 
Not competed for an allowable reason $79,830,994,649
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Table 6. FY 2004 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts  
 
 
Available for everyone for competition $73,637,071,793
 
Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $22,139,872,004
 
Competition within a limited pool $43,924,723,811
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the next 
one could be competed) 
$4,579,591,360
 
Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $9,563,623,506
 
Not competed for an allowable reason $76,203,595,586
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Table 7. FY2003 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts 
 
 
Available for everyone for competition $76,687,657,895
 
Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $10,522,430,023
 
Competition within a limited pool $28,507,833,628
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the next 
one could be competed) 
$12,823,482,136
 
Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $12,704,604,704
 
Not competed for an allowable reason $52,885,333,389
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Table 8. FY2002 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts 
 
 
Available for everyone for competition $76,687,657,895
 
Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $10,522,430,023
 
Competition within a limited pool $28,507,833,628
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the next 
one could be competed) 
$12,823,482,136
 
Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $12,704,604,704
 
Not competed for an allowable reason $52,885,333,389
 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 80 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Table 9. FY2001 Extent of Competition in DoD Contracts  
 
 
Available for everyone for competition $57,191,594,809
 
Everyone could compete, but only one bid or offer was received $7,340,047,643
 
Competition within a limited pool $19,310,456,494
 
Actions necessary to continue existing competitive contracts for continuity (until the next 
one could be competed) 
$8,659,346,483
 
Available only for groups such as disabled persons, prisoners, and regulated utilities $7,965,186,828
 
Not competed for an allowable reason $44,008,762,573
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Table 10. Definitions of Competition Categories on USASpending.gov 
Federal Procurement Data 
System “Extent Competed” 
Description 
USASpending.gov 
Competition Category Exceptions 
Full and Open Competition (A) 
Full and open competition 
 Records with a reason for non competition, 
statutory exception to fair opportunity, or set-aside are 
moved to "Competed After Exclusion." 
 Records with zero or one offers are moved to “Full 
and Open Competition but only One Bid.” 
Competitive Delivery Order 
(CDO) 
Full and Open Competition (A) 
Full and open competition, 
but only one bid 
Includes only Full and Open Competition records with zero 
or one offers. 
Full and Open Competition 
after exclusion of sources (D) Competed after exclusion 
of sources 
None 
Competed under Simplified 
Acquisition Threshold (F)  
Not Competed (C)  
Not competed None 
Not Competed under SAT (G) 
Non-Competitive Delivery 
Order (NDO) 
Not Available for Competition 
(B) 
Not Available for 
Competition 
None 
Follow-On to Competed Action 
(E) 
Follow-on to previous 
contract 
None 
At this point, neither the USASpending.gov database nor the Federal 
Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) are synchronized with the 
GAO bid protest docket or the COFC electronic docket.  Similarly, procurement 
agencies do not uniformly maintain databases of agency-level protests, and 
information on agency-level protest is not synchronized with contract information in 
FPDS-NG or USASpending.gov.  To better evaluate the impact rate (the rate of 
relationship between protests and the contract dollars impacted by protests) and the 
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that information concerning the filing of protests, the grounds, and the remedies be 
electronically fed into the FPDS-NG and USASpending.gov databases.  Once the 
databases are linked, additional studies should be conducted to examine what types 
of contracts are protested and what remedies are implemented.    
There are several ways for the Department of Defense to minimize the impact 
rate of protests and remedy the use of post-award protests by proxy.  One way, 
addressed in this paper’s survey and in the discussion, is for the DoD’s senior 
acquisition leaders to reassert control over the management of the bid protest 
process (including the use of ADR, stay overrides, and settlements) and over the 
remedies implemented in the aftermath of bid protests.   
Another way is to preemptively minimize the use of exclusionary acquisition 
strategies that lock the market for one supplier and thereby damage the defense 
industrial base because of winner-takes-all contracting.  The DoD’s reliance on 
foreign suppliers for ensuring competition cannot alleviate the industrial base 
pressures on the protest system because foreign contractors (including U.S. 
subsidiaries) have demonstrated their willingness to pursue bid protests.  It is time to 
reconsider winner-take-all strategies. 
Yet another way is to expand the scope of GAO remedies available in bid 
protests to include program management considerations in GAO bid protest 
recommendations.  Institutionally, the GAO evaluates government procurement 
programs in at least four divisions: the Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
division responsible for evaluating contracting practices; the Office of General 
Counsel, including the Procurement Law Control Group responsible for adjudicating 
bid protests and other legal staff responsible for advising agencies on fiscal law 
issues; the Defense Capabilities and Management division responsible for studying 
military readiness issues; and the Forensic Audits and Investigations group 
responsible for investigating fraud, waste, and abuse in Federal government 
operations (GAO, n.d.).  Since bid protest decisions do not get implemented in a 
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recommendations from different perspectives.  A program management perspective, 
economics perspective, procurement and fiscal law perspective, and readiness 
perspective should be included by the GAO in bid protest opinions, at least those 
that concern the Major Defense Acquisition Programs.  The GAO previously used 
bid protests to recommend procurement program improvements to federal agencies 
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IV. Survey Methodology 
A. Survey Goals 
In order to identify best practices, we sought input from top-level acquisition 
and legal leaders and experts within the military departments and all major federal 
buying agencies.  Fifty-one individuals were asked to complete an online survey.  A 
copy of the survey protocol is contained in Appendix B.  The aim of the survey was 
to document the perceptions, opinions, and recommendations of those individuals 
involved in the acquisition process.  With this information, it is then possible to 
identify trends, best practices, and deficient areas that need improvement.  Through 
this process, we were able to develop recommendations that, if adopted, could 
possibly reduce the systemic impact of bid protests on the acquisition cycle by 
empowering agencies to better manage protest costs and time disruptions. 
B. Survey Design 
The survey focused on the following three main research questions: 
 What strategies or practices are used by agencies to prevent/minimize 
the impact of bid protests? 
 To what extent are alternative dispute resolution procedures utilized as 
a means to prevent/minimize the impact of bid protests? 
 What aspects of statute, policy, or regulation preclude the effective 
resolution of protests in a manner that minimizes their systemic 
impact? 
Within each of these three areas of focus, respondents were asked to rate 
their agency’s use of specific strategies, practices, and policies pertaining to bid 
protests and ADR.  Respondents were also asked to identify what they believe to be 
the relevant factors that either constrain aggrieved offerors from or encourage them 
to protest.  Lastly, respondents were asked to describe possible improvements to 
law, policy, or regulation that would increase the effectiveness of the protest system, 
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and efficiency.  In this chapter of our Report, survey questions or answers are 
identified with quotation marks. 
C. Survey Scoring 
Respondents were asked to rate specific aspects of policy, strategy, and 
procedure on a four-point version of Likert’s eponymous rating scale, as follows: 
 4—Always or With Great Frequency 
 3—With Moderate Frequency 
 2—In Exceptional Cases or With Rare Frequency 
 1—Never 
Respondents were also given the option of choosing, “Don’t Know or 
Information Unavailable.” If a respondent chose this option, the response was not 
included in the scoring.  With respect to the question concerning factors “that 
constrain or encourage protests and possible improvements to law, policy, or 
regulation” respondents were given the opportunity to post comments in a free-form 
text box.   
D. Survey Subjects 
Major federal procurement agencies were asked to participate in the survey.  
A complete list of agencies solicited is contained in Appendix C.  Agency points of 
contact were obtained from publicly available information posted on agency websites 
or from personal contacts of this project’s lead advisor.  Each point of contact was 
sent an e-mail with a request to participate in the survey and a link to the 
www.SurveyMonkey.com website where the online survey was posted.  Point of 
contacts may have assigned additional respondents within their agency.  
Respondents were asked to identify both their agency and their professional 
background (legal or acquisition) in the survey.  Respondents’ names and actual 
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E. Survey Limitations 
It should be noted that this particular survey was not intended as a “hard 
data” appraisal of agency practices.  The results of the survey have not been 
measured against a specific set of objective criteria (e.g., number of protests per 
agency).  Rather, the survey was intended as a means to identify perceptions, 
opinions, and trends from those individuals who possess significant professional 
legal or acquisition expertise.  Further, it should be noted that the data contained in 
the survey represent the individual opinions and impressions of the respondents, 
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V. Survey Results and Analysis 
A. Response Rate and Background Results 
Fifty-one senior level acquisition and legal professionals (at the level of 
General Counsel or Deputy General Counsel for Acquisition, and Assistant 
Secretary/Administrator/Director for Acquisition), across 22 federal agencies were 
asked to participate in the survey.  Twenty-one personnel, representing 10 federal 
agencies, ultimately participated in the survey, yielding an overall response rate of 
41%.  As the survey was anonymous, it is not known who actually provided the 
responses to the survey.  Fourteen respondents (67%) identified themselves as 
acquisition professionals, while seven respondents (33%) identified themselves as 
legal professionals.  These results are summarized in Figures 6 and 7. 
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Figure 7. Respondents by Agency 
B. Strategies and Practices to Minimize Bid Protest Impact 
1. Most Frequently Cited Strategies and Practices 
Given a list of 30 different strategies and practices designed to minimize the 
impact of protests on the acquisition system, respondents were asked to rank their 
agency’s use of the strategy or practice.  Amongst all respondents, the most widely 
identified strategy and practice was, “Setting in advance clear and publicly disclosed 
evaluation criteria and adhering to those criteria during source selection,” with a 
mean score of 3.48.  The second most cited strategy or practice was “Advance 
acquisition planning,” with a mean score of 3.38.  “Agency procedures to prevent 
fraud,” “Provide quality mandatory debriefings to offerors,” "Thorough market 
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“Taking early corrective actions,” were also highly identified strategies and practices, 
each of which had a mean score at or above 3.0.  The overwhelming majority of 
respondents cited these practices with either moderate or great frequency.  The 
remaining three strategies had a score above 2.7 and below 3.0, and include 
“Independent expert reviews” by task order ombudsmen or competition advocates,” 
“Independent expert reviews” by federal small business advocates, and “Greater 
training for acquisition workforce.”  Only one strategy, “Taking early corrective 
actions,” can be characterized as a defensive strategy; the rest are preventive.  
Further, almost all preventive strategies involve only the buying agency’s personnel, 
which can reinforce agency errors or violations instead of correcting them.  Overall, 
these data suggest that agencies may not be doing all they can or should to actively 
minimize protest costs and delays once a protest is filed.  The top 10 
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Figure 8. Top 10 Defensive/Preventive Strategies and Practices Identified 
2. Least Frequently Cited Strategies and Practices 
The strategies and practices least identified among respondents, with a mean 
score less than or equal to 1.7, include the following: “Refusing to follow GAO 
advisory opinions where the GAO sustains a protest on apparently wrong grounds,” 
“Vigorous objections and requests for sanctions in response to frivolous protests,” 
“Taking corrective actions involving direct awards to protesters, instead of 
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procedures.”  The survey data are consistent with empirical data of reported GAO 
decisions.  According to the GAO, the last time the Air Force (or any other 
contracting agency) identified a protest as frivolous was in 1996, and even then the 
Air Force conceded that its “frivolous” argument was erroneous. (Kepplinger, 2009a, 
p. 12, note 13; General Accounting Office [GAO], 1996). Other options that all had 
mean scores above 1.7 and at or below 2.0 include the following: “Independent 
expert reviews…by the GAO,” which executive branch agencies may request 
concerning matters of government spending under Title 31, Section 3529 of the 
United States Code; “Other strategies” (to be defined), “ADR procedures with 
assistance from the GAO or the Court of Federal Claims” (such as GAO outcome 
prediction or negotiation assistance), “Taking corrective actions involving 
declaratory-type relief, such as changes in agency procurement policies,” “ADR 
procedures without assistance from the GAO or the Court of Federal Claims,” and 
“Seeking overrides of mandatory stays based on best interest of the United States” 
(which apply only to post-award and competitive range protests).  The majority of 
respondents cited these strategies or practices as being used rarely, if ever.  These 
results suggest that agencies would rather insulate their procurement decisions from 
outside reviews than avoid protests.  Contrary to Executive Order 12,979, agencies 
are reluctant to engage in ADR (and, therefore, conduct cost-benefit analysis, 
reconsider, or bargain over their procurement decisions).  Agencies are reluctant to 
expedite protest litigation and cut short the protest time from 100 days to fewer than 
65 days.  At the same time, agencies are reluctant to risk disputes with Congress 
over the GAO’s views on the merits of the agency procurement decision and with the 
Court of Federal Claims over the need to keep moving the acquisition programs 
through contract award and contract performance free from mandatory stays.  
However, agencies are also reluctant to end protests by rewarding protesters with 
direct contract awards.  This provides a disincentive to protesters seeking an easy 
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Figure 9. 10 Least Cited Defensive/Preventive Strategies and Practices 
C. Use of ADR Procedures to Resolve Bid Protests 
In general, survey respondents seem to believe that ADR procedures are 
infrequently used to resolve bid protests within their agencies.  This appears to 
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maximum extent practicable.  The mean score of the 11 ADR procedures 
respondents were able to choose from was 1.55, indicating that respondents believe 
their agency rarely, if ever, utilizes ADR procedures to resolve bid protests.  The 
highest rated ADR procedure was “Negotiation,” with a mean score of 2.24, implying 
that the majority of respondents believe their agency utilized this procedure to at 
least some extent.  All other ADR procedures scored at or below 1.87.  Other ADR 
procedures between the highest and the least used, in descending order, included 
the following: “GAO outcome prediction,” “Conciliation,” “GAO negotiation 
assistance,” “Hybrid techniques,” “ADR with the assistance of the Court of Federal 
Claims,” “Mediation,” “Summary trial by a Board of Contract Appeals,” “Mini-trial,” 
and “Arbitration.” The least named ADR procedure was “Evaluation by third-party 
neutrals,” with a mean score of 1.29, implying that respondents believe this 
procedure is almost never utilized by their agency.  “Other” (to be defined) 
techniques had the score of 1.20.  These findings are somewhat surprising.  
Intuitively, ADR should be favored by agencies concerned about costs or delays 
because engaging in ADR would enable the agency to conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis of its alternatives in the face of a protest and to bargain with the protester 
over these costs, benefits, and alternatives.  Further, new processes of re-evaluation 
and reconsideration of procurement decisions are inherent in the very nature of 
ADR.  This is because, as recommended by the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
Electronic Guide to Federal Procurement ADR (Interagency ADR Working Group, 
n.d.), effective protest ADR requires an agency to conduct some fact-finding and a 
risk assessment involving the strengths and weaknesses of the agency’s position.  
This process may be guided or refereed by a neutral person.  Survey data discussed 
previously on the most and least cited defensive/preventive strategies and practices 
shows that directed awards to protesters are rare, implying that new processes are 
what the protester is most likely to get as relief.  Logically, as a matter of sound 
business management, agencies should make frequent, formal decisions to pursue 
ADRs of all types as their most frequently used defensive strategies.  Instead, the 
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ADR-like in terms of time and cost impact (GAO outcome prediction).  Figure 10 
summarizes respondents’ beliefs about their agency’s use of ADR procedures to 






















































Figure 10. The Use of ADR Procedures to Resolve Bid Protests 
D. Aspects of Current Policies, Practices, Laws, or 
Regulations That Preclude Effective Resolution of 
Protests 
1. Most Frequently Cited Policies, Practices, Laws, or Regulations 
When asked to rate a list of 20 policies, practices, and laws, respondents 
overwhelmingly noted “Lack of fiscal disincentives for unjustified protests” as the 
predominant policy factor that they believe precludes or prevents the effective 
resolution of bid protests.  The majority of respondents feel this policy, which had a 
mean score of 3.20, precludes effective resolution to at least a moderate extent.  
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“Lack of properly trained acquisition workforce,” with mean scores of 3.10 and 3.0, 
respectively.  “Lack of formal sanctions at the GAO for frivolous protests,” “Strategic 
behavior by disappointed offerors who have no legitimate basis for award in order to 
recover bid and proposal costs without basis for award,” “Frivolous protest filings,” 
“Failure to maintain adequate documentation of procurement decisions,” “Failure to 
assure adherence to stated evaluation criteria,” “Delay-seeking strategies by 
incumbent contractors who have no legitimate basis for renewed awards,” and 
“Poorly designed or executed cost evaluations” had mean scores from 2.88 to 2.39, 
respectively. Presently, the GAO does not impose monetary or other sanctions for 
frivolous protests such as those imposed under Rule 11 of the Court of Federal 
Claims.  However, the GAO does dismiss frivolous protests.  Figure 11 lists the 
respondents’ top 10 policies, practices, or laws that they believe preclude effective 
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Figure 11. Top 10 Policies, Practices, or Laws That Preclude Effective 
Avoidance or Resolution of Protests 
2. Least Frequently Cited Policies, Practices, Laws, or Regulations 
Factors such as, “A lack of, or deficiencies in, agency-level bid protest 
procedures,” “Regulatory or statutory provisions discouraging ADR,” and “Other 
deficiencies in ADR procedures,” were the lowest rated factors, with mean scores of 
less than 1.5, implying that respondents believe these factors rarely, if ever, 
preclude effective avoidance or resolution of bid protests.  A possible conclusion 
from this data is that there exists an institutional lack of will to utilize ADR 
procedures.  Other least cited factors, with mean scores between 1.71 and 2.35, 
include “Agency reluctance or failure to seek award stay overrides,” “Agency 
reluctance to seek express option in protests,” “Agency reluctance to deviate from 
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discussions with offerors,” and “Poor debriefings.” This suggests that respondents 
do not regard unfair, unequal, or incomplete communications with offerors or 
agencies’ failure to use available tools to expedite programs during protests as 
making significant contributions to the protest burdens experienced by agencies.  
Figure 12 displays the 10 least prevalent factors identified by survey respondents 
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Figure 12. 10 Least Utilized Factors Precluding Effective Avoidance or 
Resolution of Bid Protests 
E. Further Analysis of Results 
1. Introduction 
Thus far, results have been presented in terms of mean results and overall 
trends from all respondents.  However, survey respondents represented a diverse 
set of agencies and had differing professional responsibilities.  Both military and 
civilian agencies were represented in the survey sample, as were both legal and 
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factors in any way influenced survey results.  The following paragraphs compare 
civilian versus military perspectives and acquisition versus legal perspectives.   
2. Civilian vs. Military Perspective 
In general, respondents representing both civilian and military agencies 
believed their agencies utilize, with at least moderate frequency, a number of 
preventive or defensive strategies and practices to minimize the possible negative 
impacts of bid protests on the acquisition system.  Further, there was a striking 
similarity between the most frequently identified practices and strategies employed 
by respondents representing both civilian and military agencies.  Figure 13 
compares the scores of the top 10 strategies identified by respondents representing 
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Figure 13. 10 Civilian Agency Strategies Compared to Military Agencies 
With respect to the utilization of ADR practices to minimize the effect of bid 
protests, both groups of respondents indicated similar beliefs about the utilization of 
various ADR practices within their agency.  In general, respondents seem to believe 
that neither civilian nor military agencies utilize ADR practices to a great extent.  
Nonetheless, it appears respondents representing civilian agencies generally cite 
their agency’s use of negotiation to a greater extent than their military counterparts, 
with mean scores for this technique of 2.57 and 2.00, respectively.  This finding is 
inconsistent with the tenets of E.O. 12,979, the FAR requirement for all parties to 
“use their best efforts to resolve concerns raised by an interested party at the 
contracting officer level through open and frank discussions” (FAR, 2010, § 
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then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Acquisition and Logistics 
Management RDML Sean Crean for greater government-industry communications 
as a way to avoid bid protests.  Civilian agencies also topped their military 
counterparts in utilizing “GAO outcome prediction,” “ADR with the assistance of the 
Court of Federal Claims,” and, barely, “Mini-trials.”  On the other hand, military 
agencies topped civilian agencies in the use of “GAO negotiation assistance,” 
“Conciliation,” “Mediation,” “Summary trial by a Board of Contract Appeals,” “Hybrid 
techniques,” “Other techniques” (to be defined), and, barely, “Evaluation by third-
party neutrals.”  On “Arbitration,” the civilian and military agencies were equal.  This 
suggests that, when military agencies actually use ADR, they are much more 
creative with their ADR approaches than civilian agencies.  However, “Negotiation” 
was the only ADR technique that was cited by the military with a mean score equal 
to or over 2.0.  This suggests that overall use of ADR in military agencies is very low.  
Figure 14 compares the civilian agency respondents’ identification of ADR 
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Figure 14. Comparison of Civilian and Military Agency Use of ADR 
Procedures 
Amongst both groups of respondents there seems to be a strong similarity 
between their view of policies, practices, laws, and regulations that preclude 
effective avoidance or resolution of bid protests.  Both groups of respondents cite 
the “Lack of fiscal disincentives for unsuccessful protests” as the most prevalent 
factor precluding effective resolution or avoidance of protests.  Both groups also cite 
“Poor acquisition planning” and the “Lack of adequately trained acquisition 
personnel” as significant factors in precluding the effective resolution or avoidance of 
protests.  However, there is a strong difference regarding the frequency with which 
respondents believe “Agency reluctance to seek award stay overrides” precludes 
effective resolution or avoidance of bid protests.  Amongst military respondents, the 
mean score for this factor was 2.13, compared to 1.17 for civilian respondents.  
Although the military score was still low, indicating respondents’ belief that this factor 
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nonetheless raises a number of possible implications.  It is possible that military 
agencies are less inclined to seek overrides of mandatory procurement stays than 
their civilian counterparts.  If time delays associated with a bid protest are in fact 
impeding mission accomplishments, then agencies should seek overrides in the best 
interests of the United States, consistent with FAR (2010) Part 33.104(c).  In terms 
of the most frequently cited reasons precluding effective protest resolution, factors 
such as “Lack of properly trained acquisition workforce,” “Strategic behavior by 
disappointed offerors who have no legitimate basis for award in order to recover bid 
and proposal costs,” “Lack of formal sanctions at the GAO for frivolous protests,” 
“Frivolous protest filings,” and “Failure to assure adherence to stated evaluation 
criteria” were comparatively greater problems for military agencies.  For civilian 
agencies, comparatively greater problems included “Lack of fiscal disincentives for 
unjustified protests such as ‘loser pays’ arrangements,” “Poor acquisition planning,” 
“Delay-seeking strategies by incumbent contractors who have no legitimate basis for 
renewed award,” and “Poor debriefings.”  Figure 15 compares the 10 most 
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Figure 15. Comparison of the 10 Most Frequently Identified Civilian and 
Military Agency Perceptions of Processes, Laws, Policies, or Regulations 
Military agencies cite comparatively lower problems with “Failure to assure 
fair discussions with offerors.”  On the other hand, civilian agencies cite 
comparatively lower problems with all other categories, including “Regulatory or 
statutory provisions discouraging ADR,” “Other aspects” (to be defined), “Other 
deficiencies in the ADR process,” “Agency reluctance/failure to seek award stay 
overrides,” “Lack of, or deficiencies, in agency-level bid protest procedures,” 
“Agency reluctance to seek express options in protests,” “Agency reluctance to 
deviate from GAO recommendations,” and “Poorly designed or executed cost 
evaluations.”  For the military agencies, “Agency reluctance/failure to seek award 
stay overrides,” “Agency culture that discourages ADR or reconsideration of award 
decisions,” “Lack of, or deficiencies in, agency-level bid protest procedures,” and 
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prevalent or significant than for civilian agencies. Figure 16 compares the 10 least 
frequently identified responses of civilian agency respondents with those from 
military agencies. 
 
Figure 16. Comparison of the 10 Least Frequently Identified Civilian and 
Military Agency Perceptions of Processes, Laws, Policies, or Regulations 
3. Acquisition vs. Legal Perspective 
When comparing the perspective of respondents employed as legal 
professionals with that of respondents employed as acquisition professionals, there 
was much similarity in opinion with regard to their beliefs about the use of preventive 
or defensive strategies designed to minimize the negative impacts of bid protests on 
the acquisition process.  Despite this strong similarity in response, there were a few 
notable exceptions that bear mentioning.  Acquisition professionals cite a higher 
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score for this factor amongst acquisition professionals was 3.14, compared to a 
mean score of 2.40 for legal professionals.  Similarly, acquisition professional 
respondents indicated that they believe their agencies tend to take corrective action 
to include involving the protestor as a subcontractor or member of the winning 
team(s) to a greater extent than legal professionals would seem to indicate.  The 
mean score for this factor was 2.50 for acquisition professionals, while it was only 
1.83 for legal professionals.  Legal professionals identified “Advance acquisition 
planning,” “Thorough market research and engagement with industry,” “Greater 
training for acquisition workforce,” “Hiring or assigning additional acquisition 
workforce,” and “Awarding extensions or bridge contracts to incumbents protesting 
recompetitions” more often than acquisition professionals.  The opposite relationship 
was for factors including “Setting in advance clear and publicly disclosed evaluation 
criteria and adhering to these criteria during evaluation,” “Providing quality 
mandatory debriefings to offerors,” “Agency procedures to prevent fraud, 
procurement integrity violations, or organizational conflict of interest violations,” and 
“Agency-level protest procedures.” Both groups cited “Taking early corrective action” 
with the same frequency.  Figure 17 compares the 10 most frequently identified 
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Figure 17. Comparison of the 10 Most Strategies and Practices Most 
Frequently Identified by Legal Professionals With Those Most Frequently 
Identified by Acquisition Professionals 
Legal professionals identified strategies and practices such as “Acquisition 
strategies involving shorter-term contracts,” “Taking corrective actions involving 
declaratory-type relief, such as changes to agency procurement policies,” “Seeking 
overrides of mandatory stays based on best interest of the United States,” “Taking 
corrective actions involving inclusion of protesters as subcontractors or members of 
winning teams,” “Independent expert reviews … by the GAO,” and “Other strategies” 
(to be defined) less often than acquisition professionals.  The relationship was 
reversed for strategies such as “Refusal to follow GAO recommendations…where 
the GAO sustains a protest on apparently wrong grounds,” “Vigorous objections and 
requests for sanctions with respect to frivolous protests, and “Taking express option 
requests.”  Both sides were equally low on “Corrective actions involving direct 
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Figure 18 compares the 10 least identified strategies and practices of legal 
professionals with those of acquisition professionals. 
 
Figure 18. Comparison of 10 Strategies and Practices Least Frequently 
Identified by Legal Professionals with Those Least Frequently Identified by 
Acquisition Professionals  
Amongst legal and acquisition respondents, the most divergent opinions on 
ADR related to the use of ADR procedures to resolve bid protests.  When asked to 
rate their agency’s use of 11 different ADR procedures, the mean score amongst 
legal respondents was 1.78, whereas the mean score amongst acquisition 
respondents was 1.39.  This data indicates that ADR is not being employed to great 
effect to reduce costs and program delays.  Since ADR begins at the agency level, 
its lack of use is surprising.  Acquisition managers have a desire to minimize cost 
and time delays, yet they are under-utilizing a valuable tool to help them in that 
regard.  While these results indicate that ADR procedures are not employed with 
great frequency to resolve protests, a few specific areas are worth noting.  When 
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protests, legal respondents had a mean score of 2.70 compared to a mean score of 
2.0 for acquisition respondents.  Similarly, when asked to rate their agency’s use of 
“Conciliation” as a technique to resolve bid protests, legal respondents had a mean 
score of 2.20 compared to a mean score of 1.33 for acquisition respondents.  These 
scores reflect the opinions of the respondents and are not necessarily reflective of 
actual agency behavior.  Nonetheless, the scores provide significant insight into how 
various personnel within an agency perceive the use of ADR techniques.  Lawyers 
also seemed to participate more often in “GAO outcome prediction”, “GAO 
negotiation assistance,” “ADR with the assistance of the Court of Federal Claims,” 
“Hybrid techniques,” “Summary trial by a Board of Contract Appeals,” “Evaluation by 
third-party neutral(s),” “Mini-trial,” “Other techniques” (to be defined), and 
“Arbitration” than acquisition officials. Only for “Mediation” was the frequency 
reversed.  It appears that, in contrast to lawyers, agency acquisition officials rarely 
become involved in ADR in resolving bid protests.  Figure 19 compares the survey 
results of respondents with a legal background to those of respondents with an 
acquisition background. 
 
Figure 19. Comparison of Legal and Acquisition Perspectives on the 
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In general, both acquisition and legal respondents seem to have similar 
perceptions regarding the aspects of processes, policies, practices, laws, or 
regulations that preclude effective avoidance or resolution of bid protests.  Yet 
despite the similarity of opinion, the data provide some insight into the attitudes and 
perception of both parties.  Overwhelmingly, legal respondents cited “poor 
acquisition planning” as the aspect or policy that most often precludes effective 
avoidance or resolution.  The mean score of legal respondents for this particular 
factor was 3.29, indicating that they believe this factor precludes effective avoidance 
or resolution of protests with at least moderate frequency.  Comparatively, 
respondents with an acquisition background also cited this factor as precluding 
effective resolution or avoidance of bid protests, albeit to a lesser extent, with a 
mean score amongst respondents of 3.00.  The factor identified as precluding 
effective avoidance or resolution of protests to the greatest extent by respondents 
with an acquisition background was the “Lack of fiscal disincentives for unjustified 
protests,” with a mean score of 3.50.  However, respondents with a legal 
background scored this factor slightly lower, with a mean score of 2.83.  Lawyers 
also cited with greater frequency than acquisition professionals such aspects or 
policies such as “Lack of properly trained acquisition workforce,” “Failure to maintain 
adequate documentation of procurement decisions,” and “Strategic behavior by 
disappointed offerors who have no legitimate basis for award in order to recover bid 
and proposal costs.”  On the other hand, acquisition professionals also cited “Lack of 
formal sanctions at GAO for frivolous protests,” “Frivolous protest filings,” and 
“Delay-seeking strategies by incumbent contractors who have no legitimate basis for 
renewed awards.”  This comparison suggests that agency lawyers generally do not 
share the view of agency acquisition officials concerning the extent of compliance of 
agency procurement practices with procurement laws and regulations.  Figure 20 
compares the 10 most frequently identified factors that preclude effective resolution 
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Figure 20. Comparison of the 10 Views Most Frequently Identified by 
Acquisition and Legal Professionals as Factors That Preclude Effective 
Resolution or Avoidance of Bid Protests  
Across the board, legal professionals seem to believe more than acquisition 
professionals that all least-cited factors except for “Other deficiencies in ADR 
practices” (to be defined) can have greater detrimental impact on effective resolution 
of bid protests.  For lawyers, the least cited factors ranged from the lowest of “Other 
deficiencies in ADR” ( to be defined) and “Regulatory/statutory provisions 
discouraging ADR,” to the following more often-cited factors: “Agency culture that 
discourages ADR or reconsideration of award decisions,” “Agency reluctance to 
seek express option,” to “Lack/deficiencies in agency-level bid protest procedures,” 
“Agency reluctance to deviate from GAO recommendations,” “Agency 
reluctance/failure to seek stay overrides,” “Failure to assure fair discussion with 
offerors,” and “Poor debriefings.” For acquisition professionals, these factors ranged 
from the lowest of “Other deficiencies in ADR” (to be defined), to the following more 
often-cited factors: “Regulatory or statutory provisions discouraging ADR,” “Agency 
culture that discourages ADR,” “Agency reluctance to seek express options,” 
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deviate from GAO recommendations,” “Agency reluctance to seek stay overrides,” 
“Failure to assure fair discussions,” and “Poor debriefings.” Figure 21 compares the 
10 least frequently identified factors that preclude effective resolution or avoidance 









































































Figure 21. Comparison of the 10 Views Least Frequently Identified by 
Acquisition and Legal Professional as Factors That Preclude Effective 
Resolution or Avoidance of Bid Protests 
4. Additional Considerations 
In addition to the inherent value of the perceptions, views, and opinions 
offered by respondents, there is additional value in analyzing the nature of their 
responses.  The first survey question asked respondents to identify what they 
believe to be the frequency of their agency’s use of various preventive and defensive 
strategies to minimize the negative impact of bid protests.  The third question asked 
respondents to identify the frequency with which they believe aspects of current 
policies, practices, laws, or regulations preclude effective resolution or avoidance of 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 114 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
distinct ideas.  First, what do agencies do to minimize the impact of bid protests, 
and, second, what factors prevent effective resolution of protests?  It appears that 
agencies’ defensive strategies are not tailored to match the agencies’ avowed 
problems with bid protests. 
Intuitively, one expects that some of the responses to these questions are in 
at least some way related.  If respondents believe that “poor acquisition planning” is 
the factor that most frequently prevents the effective resolution of bid protests within 
their agency, then it stands to reason that respondents should also believe that the 
preventive strategy or practice of advanced acquisition planning is employed 
infrequently within their agency.  Conversely, if respondents believe  advanced 
acquisition planning is almost always used as a preventive strategy or practice within 
their agency, then they should believe “poor acquisition planning” rarely, if ever, is a 
factor that precludes effective resolution or avoidance of bid protests in their agency.  
Other factors, specifically those that relate to frivolous protests, acquisition workforce 
training, debriefings, and agency-level protest procedures have logical relationships 
as well.  Figure 22 displays the mean respondent answer to the question about a 
specific strategy or practice and compares that result to the mean respondent 
answer to the corresponding question about a process or policy that precludes 
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Figure 22. Comparison of Agency Defensive Strategies and Processes 
That Preclude Effective Resolution of Protests  
The results of this comparison are varied.  Some of the results are quite 
intuitive, while others are not so intuitive and may require further research.  When 
asked to evaluate the extent to which frivolous protests preclude effective resolution 
or avoidance of protests at their agency, the mean respondent score was 2.83.  This 
indicates that they believe frivolous protests may preclude effective resolution or 
avoidance of protests to a moderate extent.  A natural strategy for an agency 
wishing to counteract a frivolous protest would be to vigorously object to the protest 
and request sanctions in response to the protest.  However, amongst survey 
respondents, this strategy had a mean score of 1.67, indicating that respondents 
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certainly possible that if respondent agencies utilized a more vigorous approach in 
objecting to bid protests that the effect frivolous protests have on precluding effective 
resolution would decrease. 
Similarly, respondents indicated, on average, that they believe their agencies 
utilize “Quality mandatory debriefings” with a fairly high degree of frequency.  The 
mean score amongst respondents for this strategy was 3.3.  In comparison, on 
average, respondents indicated that they believe “Poor debriefings” prevent effective 
resolution or avoidance of protests rarely.  The mean score for this practice was 
2.35.  If, in fact, agencies are providing quality debriefings to unsuccessful offerors, 
then there should be very few instances where a poor debriefing has prevented or 
precluded the effective resolution or avoidance of a protest.  Respondent answers to 
the survey seem to support this conclusion. 
On average, respondents indicated that they believe “Greater training for the 
acquisition workforce” is a strategy employed by their agency to minimize the impact 
of a bid protest with somewhat less than moderate frequency.  The mean score for 
this factor was 2.71.  Similarly, respondents indicated that they believe the “Lack of a 
properly trained acquisition workforce” is a practice that precludes effective protest 
resolution with moderate frequency.  The mean score amongst respondents for this 
factor was 3.0.  The implication here is somewhat obvious, nonetheless it bears 
stating explicitly.  Greater training for the acquisition workforce could likely result in 
fewer instances where a poorly trained workforce is a factor that precludes effective 
resolution of protests. 
Other results of this comparison were not so consistently logical.  “Advance 
acquisition planning” was cited with extremely high frequency by survey 
respondents.  This indicates that they believe their agency employs this particular 
strategy quite often as a means to prevent or avoid a bid protest.  The mean score 
amongst respondents for this factor was 3.38.  However, respondents also cited 
“Poor acquisition planning” with relatively high frequency.  The mean score amongst 
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instances, their agency is precluded from effectively resolving or avoiding protests 
because of “poor acquisition planning.”  In this regard the results are counterintuitive.  
If in fact, good advanced acquisition planning is happening on a regular basis, then it 
would seem difficult to conclude that poor acquisition planning is one of the most 
frequent practices that precludes effective resolution or avoidance of protests.  This 
may actually be a case of perception, rather than reality.  Quite possibly, 
respondents feel that acquisition planning is a consistently employed practice within 
their agency, when in fact it is not.  Or conversely, respondents may feel that “poor 
acquisition planning” is the most common practice that precludes effective protest 
resolution when in fact there are other factors that preclude effective protest 
resolution to a greater extent.   
Significant disparities were also noted between the use of, and need for, 
agency-level protest procedures, stay overrides, and assurance of clear and 
consistent evaluation criteria. 
F. Further Implications 
In general, the two negative externalities (from the agency perspective) 
associated with a bid protest are program delay and increased costs.  In order to 
counteract each of these two negative externalities, there are a number of strategies 
an agency can employ.  Such strategies as utilizing the GAO’s express option, 
agency override of mandatory GAO stays, early corrective action, and vigorous 
objection to frivolous or meritless protests, if effectively employed, could potentially 
reduce the delays associated with a bid protest.  Figure 23 compares the relative 
frequency with which respondents believe their agencies use a number of these 
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Figure 23. Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies Used to 
Counteract Delays Caused by Bid Protests 
The data clearly shows that respondents believe their agencies utilize 
strategies such as “Agency-level bid protest procedures” and “Taking early 
corrective actions” with fairly high frequency.  However strategies such as “Taking 
express option requests under GAO procedures,” “Vigorous objections and requests 
for sanctions in response to frivolous protests,” and “Refusal to follow GAO advisory 
opinions and recommendations where the GAO sustains a protest on apparently 
wrong grounds” are identified infrequently.  However, obtaining and following a 
formal GAO recommendation to recompete could mean delaying a procurement 
program by at least 5–6 months, including 100 days for GAO decision, time for 
revision of the solicitation, 45 days for default procurement administrative lead time 
(PALT) under FAR Part 5, and additional time for evaluation.  This implies that 
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delays associated with bid protests.  In other words, data suggest that agencies, in 
practice, are not particularly concerned with delays to procurement programs from 
bid protests.   
Similarly, agencies have a number of strategies they can employ to reduce 
the costs associated with bid protests.  Actions such as negotiation, use of ADR 
procedures, early corrective action, and vigorous objections to frivolous protests are 
but a number of strategies that, if effectively employed, have the potential to reduce 
costs.  Each of these processes potentially results in a resolution of the protest prior 
to formal adjudication.  As a result, agencies may be able to avoid paying 
bid/proposal costs and legal fees to a protestor.  Figure 24 compares the relative 
frequency with which respondents believe their agencies use a number of these 
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Figure 24. Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies Used to 
Reduce Costs Associated With Bid Protests 
From this data, it appears that beyond “Taking early corrective action,” 
respondents do not believe their agencies use any of the aforementioned strategies 
with great frequency.  Unless agencies take early corrective action or attempt some 
negotiation early on, they are unlikely to initiate other ADR procedures or refuse to 
follow costly GAO recommendations that may involve direct payments to protesters 
or indirect expenditures.  The implication here is quite the same as with program 
delays.  It appears that agencies may not be effectively utilizing all the tools they 
have to reduce the costs associated with a bid protest.  In other words, data suggest 
that agencies may not be very serious about cutting protest costs using presently 
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Beyond strategies to reduce costs and delays, agencies may also employ 
strategies to reduce or eliminate a disappointed or unsuccessful offeror’s inclination 
to protest for strategic business reasons (e.g., to gain greater insight into agency 
selection decisions or greater access to agency information).  Quality debriefings 
and acquisition strategies that involve multiple awards have the potential to reduce 
the number of protests filed that are motivated in part by strategic business 
decisions.  Figure 25 compares the relative frequency with which respondents 
believe their agencies use these strategies and practices. 
 
Figure 25. Relative Identification of Defensive Strategies Used to 
Reduce Protestor’s Inclination to Protest for Strategic Business Reasons 
This data shows that respondents believe their agencies utilize both 
mandatory and non-mandatory debriefings to offerors with fairly high frequency.  
However, respondents seem to believe that “Acquisition strategies involving multiple 
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employed less frequently.  To the extent that further employment of such an 
acquisition strategy is practicable, it may represent an opportunity for agencies to 
“protest-proof” their procurements and reduce the strategic business reasons behind 
a protestor’s filing. 
G. Respondent Comments and Opinions 
Survey respondents were given the opportunity to provide comments 
regarding contractor motivation to initiate protests in general; to file protests at the 
GAO, under agency-level programs, or at the Court of Federal Claims; to challenge 
an agency’s decision to override an automatic stay at the Court of Federal Claims; 
and to resolve protests through ADR procedures.  Respondents were also offered 
the opportunity to provide suggestions for improvements to policies, processes, 
practices, laws or regulation.  The range of comments provided was quite diverse.  
The following paragraphs summarize some of the common themes.  Additional 
comments of particular note or interest are included as well. 
Respondent comments largely fell into one of two categories: comments that 
involved a strategy or practice, and comments that involve a policy, regulation, or 
aspect of law.  In regards to strategies and practices that could potentially reduce 
the negative impact of bid protests, respondents noted issues related to training and 
communication, including the benefits of a quality debriefing.  One respondent in 
particular noted the need for “improvements in the quality, content, and context of 
information given in award debriefings [as a means] to prevent protests that are filed 
as ‘fishing expeditions.’”  
A number of respondents indicated that peer reviews were practices 
employed by their agency to minimize the negative impact of bid protests.  Typical 
responses included comments, such as, “Peer reviews at all levels[;]…my division 
has incorporated peer reviews for all new procurements…above Simplified 
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Each acquisition office has a “peer” type of contract review board, which 
considers planned solicitations and contract awards over specific thresholds.  
[A] Senior Procurement Executive reviews all acquisition plans exceeding 
$10M and a formal Investment Review Board, including acquisition 
representation, review[s] planned acquisitions over $75M. 
Respondents cited protestor familiarity with GAO processes, protestors’ belief 
in the GAO’s independence, and the relative inexpensiveness of filing and litigating 
at the GAO as the primary reasons why protestors elect to file protests with the 
GAO.  Respondents also made a number of comments regarding agency-level 
protest procedures.  The majority of comments seem to indicate that trust is a major 
factor in the success of an agency-level protest forum.  Namely, protestors must 
trust that agencies will be able to set aside any agency bias and issue decisions in a 
fair, impartial, and equitable manner.  Comments contained in Figure 26 seem to 
indicate that respondents believe protestors do not have sufficient trust in agency-
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Please briefly describe any factors that, in your experience, motivate or constrain a 
contractor’s decisions to: 
  
protest under your agency’s agency-level procedures: 
  
Most agency protests are filed pro se by a vendor who thinks a mistake has been made 
but doesn’t want to involve itself in a more formal process. Though many agency 
protests contain intemperate language, protestors to the agency generally see 
themselves as in a less adverse position to the agency than those who go to GAO or the 
Court of Federal Claims. 
 
Distrust that Agency will reverse itself prevents some contractors from using agency 
procedures. 
 
Lack of confidence on the part of industry that the agency will provide (be able to 
provide) appropriate relief. 
 
We encourage agency protests. We would prefer to educate disappointed offerors 
through this process rather than GAO. 
 
Contractors are reluctant to issue agency level protests fearing the agency doesn’t fairly 
consider their protest. 
 
Likelihood of greater payout/success and greater familiarity with GAO 
Figure 26. Respondents’ Comments on Factors That Motivate a 
Protester to Utilize, or Constrain a Protestor From Utilizing, Agency Protest 
Procedures  
These comments are consistent with other academic studies which note “contractors 
and attorneys have voiced doubts about the general ability of procuring agency 
personnel to render fair and impartial protest decisions” (Troff, 2005b, p. 148). 
In terms of policy, the lack of a financial disincentive for protestors filing a 
protest that is ultimately denied or dismissed was consistently noted by respondents.  
Figure 27 lists some of the most common comments regarding the lack of 
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VI. Analysis of Federal Aviation 
Administration and Army Material 
Command Agency Practices 
A. Introduction to the FAA’S ODRA Process 
In an effort to transform the National Airspace System, Congress specifically 
exempted the FAA from all procurement laws and acquisition regulations when it 
passed the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-50, § 348(1995).  Congress mandated that the FAA 
develop a new and distinct acquisition system.  Utilizing advice and opinions from 
public and private sector experts, the FAA created the Acquisition Management 
System (AMS).  AMS became the system used by the FAA to procure the material, 
resources, and services it would need to carry out its mission. 
With the implementation of AMS, it became clear that the FAA and its 
contracting partners would no longer have access to the GAO as a forum to resolve 
bid protests.  As a result, in 1997 the FAA created a new office, known as the Office 
of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA).  The ODRA is the statutorily 
designated forum for all contract disputes and bid protests arising under the FAA’s 
AMS. (49 U.S.C.§ 40110(d)(3) and (4) (2010)).  At the core of the ODRA dispute 
resolution process is a belief that it is in the interests of both the FAA and its private 
sector partners to work together to voluntarily resolve procurement related 
disagreements in a timely and equitable manner. 
Congress directed the Administrator of the FAA to ensure that at a minimum, 
the AMS resolved “bid protests and contract disputes related thereto, using 
consensual alternative dispute resolution techniques to the maximum extent 
practicable.” (49 U.S.C. § 40110(d)(1)(B) (2010)).   Under this system, formal 
litigation should only be employed as a last resort to resolve a bid protest.  As 
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Law 108-176, § 224b(2)),  “a bid protest or contract dispute that is not addressed or 
resolved through alternative dispute resolution shall be adjudicated by the 
Administrator through Dispute Resolution Officers or Special Masters of the FAA 
ODRA (2003, § 224b(1)).  
ADR produces a faster and less costly outcome when compared to litigation. 
(Worthington & Goldsman, 1998, p. 472).  The FAA has successfully used ADR to 
resolve most of the protests brought before the ODRA.  Additionally, through ADR 
the parties themselves maintain control over the process and usually end up 
structuring a settlement that produces a “win-win” situation for those involved.  
Unlike litigation, ADR helps the parties involved preserve a mutually beneficial and 
amicable business relationship with one and other.  In the simplest of terms, the 
ODRA process was designed with the goal of providing a fair, fast, and efficient 
resolution to disputes and protests under adjudication standards outlined in the 
Administrative Procedures Act. (5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2010)).  
Because the ODRA expects both parties to attempt ADR, cases are almost 
universally resolved through ADR.  Further, the decision to use ADR is not left up to 
the discretion of the parties involved, but rather it is immediately discussed during 
the initial status conference, which is normally held within the first five business days 
after a protest filing (Department of Transportation [DoT], Federal Aviation 
Administration [FAA], Procedures for Protests and Contract Disputes, 2010, 14 
C.F.R. § 17.17(b)).  
B. Key Differences Between the FAA’s and the GAO’s Bid 
Protest Process 
In terms of volume, the caseload at the GAO is significantly larger than at 
ODRA.  In an average year, ODRA handles just over 30 protests a year (Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Chief Counsel, Office of Dispute Resolution for 
Acquisition [FAA OCC ODRA], 2009) compared to the more than 1,400 protests filed 
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on bid protests since the 1920s (Kepplinger, 2009b, p. 2).  On average, the GAO 
issues a decision between day 75 and day 100.  In certain circumstances, whether 
on the request of a party, or on its own initiative, the GAO may utilize an express 
option, wherein a decision is made within 65 days (GAO Bid Protest Regulations [4 
C.F.R. § 21.10], 2010). 
In comparison, the process at the ODRA is normally concluded at the 52-day 
mark (Lieberman & Morgan, 2008, p. 29). Since the ODRA is part of the FAA, there 
is greater cooperative interaction between ODRA officers, FAA program offices, and 
contractors in pursuing mutually agreeable ADR efforts at early stages of the 
acquisition process, oftentimes prior to the filing of a formal protest with the ODRA.  
Comparatively, the GAO, as an agency in the Legislative Branch, rarely makes 
recommendations or influences agency action prior to receipt of a protest by an 
aggrieved party.   
A key difference between the ODRA and the GAO is that the ODRA uses 
ADR as the primary method of protest resolution, whereas the GAO tends to 
promote ADR only if the parties concerned are willing. Within the ODRA, there is a 
presumption that parties will utilize ADR.  In fact, within five days of the initial status 
conference, parties must elect to use ADR or submit “joint or separate explanations 
as to why ADR proceedings will not be used and the Default Adjudicative Process 
will be needed” (DoT, FAA, Procedures for Protests and Contract Disputes, 2010, 14 
C.F.R. § 17.17 (b)(1)(c)).  In addition, even if the parties are unable to utilize ADR, 
the FAA may nonetheless utilize “informal ADR techniques…concurrently with and in 
parallel to adjudication” (DoT, FAA, Procedures for Protests and Contract Disputes, 
2010, 14 C.F.R. § 17.31 (c)).  However, the greatest distinction between the two 
protest forums is in the character of the forum itself.  The GAO process is extremely 
formal and adversarial in nature.  Agency reports must be produced and defended 
by the agency, and the aggrieved offeror has the ability to offer comments on the 
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In comparing the notional time frames of a bid protest under the GAO system 
and the FAA system, one can clearly see the benefits of the FAA system.  As shown 
in Figure 28, the FAA system, with its emphasis on ADR, usually results in an earlier 
resolution of the protest than compared to GAO procedures. 
 
Figure 28. Comparison of GAO and FAA Timelines of Key Protest Milestones 
(GAO Bid Protest Regulations, 2010, § 21; DoT, FAA, Procedures for 
Protests and Contract Disputes, 2010, 14 C.F.R. § 17) 
C. U.S. Army Materiel Command’s Agency-Level Protest 
Program 
Under the authority of FAR Section 33.103(c), AMC attempts to use a 
progressive approach, coupled with creative initiatives, in an effort to meet its 
litigation challenges.  The objectives of the AMC ADR program are to utilize an 
interdisciplinary approach to address conflict resolution and to design processes that 
enable the parties to foster creative, acceptable solutions.  The result is expeditious 
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The primary steps in AMC’s ADR process include negotiation, mediation, fact-
finding, arbitration, and mini-trial.  Commonly used definitions of these terms and 
other ADR terms applicable to procurement-related ADR are contained in Appendix 
A.  In 1991, this process was developed and within four years the AMC-Level 
Protest Program was designated as one of the “Ten Best Government Procurement 
Practices” by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP).  The 1995 Executive 
Order 12,979, directing federal agencies to allow protests to be filed at an agency 
level above the CO, was a process modeled after the AMC-Level Protest Program 
(AMC, 1997, p. 5).  
Some of the remedies offered by AMC’s Level Protest Program include the 
following: 
 Contract termination, 
 Recompetition of requirement, 
 Solicitation revision, 
 Direction to not exercise an option, 
 Contract award, and 
 A combination of the above. 
Using these remedies, AMC has resolved hundreds of protests in-house, avoiding 
the cost of litigation associated with a protest at the GAO.  In order to reduce the 
number of protests, AMC places a strong emphasis on conducting meaningful 
debriefings.  This strategy supports the agency’s ADR initiative.  AMC encourages 
its activities and contractors to “partner.” This is a philosophy and process that 
emphasizes open communication and early identification of potential problems.  The 
partnering parties work together to develop a charter that identifies common goals 
and objectives that the parties are committed to achieving together.  The non-
adversarial nature of this technique seems to have improved the nature of the 
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Consistent with President Clinton’s Executive Order, which still remains in 
effect, AMC has developed an iterative strategic planning process to better 
coordinate ADR programs.  The goal of this effort is to better leverage ADR 
resources and to create greater knowledge about ADR processes throughout the 
Army. 
AMC is working to expand ADR training opportunities for lawyers and non-
lawyers alike.  In an effort to identify conflicts likely to benefit from ADR, but for 
which there exists no well-established ADR program, AMC has increased its focus 
on information collection from the field.  AMC’s Office of Command Counsel is 
pooling the resources and knowledge available at field installations, with an eye 
towards expanding the use of ADR in areas such as Equal Employment Opportunity, 
labor-management relations, and environmental stewardship (U.S. Department of 
the Army Office of General Counsel [USAOGC], 2010, p. 13). 
D. Key Differences Between the AMC and GAO’s Bid Protest 
Process 
Like the FAA, the number of protests filed with AMC is significantly smaller 
than the number of protests filed with the GAO.  AMC handles about 75 protests per 
year compared to the over 1,400 protests filed with the GAO in a given year.  
Average decision times, however, are shorter at AMC.  AMC is able to issue its 
decisions within fifteen (15) days, far in advance of the thirty-five (35) day 
requirement of FAR (2010) Part 33.103(c).   Comparatively, under the express 
option, decisions at the GAO are issued within sixty-five (65) days at GAO or 
between seventy-five (75) and one-hundred (100) days under GAO’s normal 
adjudicative process.   Figure 29 compares the AMC’s protest timeline to that of the 
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Figure 29. Comparison of GAO and AMC Timelines of Key Protest 
Milestones Based on GAO Bid Protest Regulations and the AMC ADR Guide 
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VII. Summary and Analysis 
Clearly, best practices exist within the federal government.  The FAA and 
AMC programs represent two leading-edge programs, designed from the outset to 
create a harmonious business relationship between government and private 
industry.  The professional men and women who staff the acquisition and legal 
offices in the federal government are another clear source of best practices.  Their 
tremendous professional knowledge, significant expertise, and practical experience 
were the basis for our research survey.  
Acquisition managers are no doubt interested in reducing program costs and 
time delays.  Some of the more effective ways to do so are to employ ADR 
processes to the maximum extent practicable, to seek overrides of mandatory stays 
when in the best interests of the government, to take voluntary corrective action 
when appropriate, and to raise objections to protests that are frivolous or otherwise 
lack merit. From our research, it seems that in many instances such practices are 
often under-utilized or not employed at all.  We are left with a number of answers to 
the research questions considered at the beginning of this project.   
A. Answers to Research Questions 
1. Strategies and Practices Employed 
 What strategies or practices are currently being used to minimize the 
impact of bid protest-related delays and costs on the acquisition 
process while maintaining integrity, economy, and efficiency? 
Our research has shown that there are numerous strategies and practices 
currently being used to minimize the impact of bid protests on the acquisition 
process, while maintaining the ideals of integrity, economy, and efficiency.  From our 
review of procedures at the FAA and AMC, we see that ADR is being utilized as an 
effective tool to minimize the impact of protests.  What characterizes the ADR 
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protests will be resolved through ADR, unless there are countervailing reasons to 
the contrary.   
From our survey of acquisition and legal professionals, a number of these 
practices have been identified:   
 Setting in advance clear and publicly disclosed evaluation criteria and 
adhering to these criteria during source selection; 
 Advanced acquisition planning; 
 Agency procedures to prevent fraud, procurement integrity violations, 
and/or organizational conflicts of interests; 
 Providing quality mandatory debriefings; 
 Thorough market research and engagement with industry; and 
 Agency-level protest procedures. 
Some of the comments we received from survey respondents also 
demonstrate that institutional peer reviews are practiced by many federal agencies.  
Peer reviews may go beyond just merely reviewing a CO’s technical documentation.  
Peer reviews can encompass a review of overall acquisition strategies. 
2. Barriers to Effective Resolution 
 What current processes or regulations preclude effective avoidance or 
resolution of bid protests in a manner that minimizes adverse impacts 
on the acquisition system? 
Our survey identified a number of process and regulations that preclude 
effective resolution or avoidance of bid protests.  Some of the most common 
processes, regulations, and policies include the following: 
 The lack of fiscal disincentives for unjustified protests, such as “loser 
pays” arrangements; 
 Poor acquisition planning; 
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 Frivolous protest filings; and 
 Lack of formal sanctions at the GAO for frivolous protests. 
However, our research also uncovered some anomalies in the agencies’ 
behavior.  Academic and professional literature suggests that agencies may be 
tacitly consenting to full-blown protest litigation for various reasons. At the same 
time, survey data suggest that agencies have not tailored their defensive strategies 
to match the avowed problems with bid protests, and that agencies apparently fail to 
utilize currently available tools to reduce costs and delays from protest litigation.  
This suggests either that appropriate training is lacking, or that some procurement 
organizations may actually prefer to “buy” a formal decision on their procurement 
programs.  Either way, accountability measures may be required to ensure effective 
defenses against procurement protests.     
3. Obstacles to Effective Cooperation 
 What are the obstacles that impede effective cooperation in resolving 
bid protests? 
Most legal and acquisition professionals surveyed indicated that they believe 
their agencies do not use ADR to a great extent to resolve protests.  However, the 
research we conducted regarding the FAA and AMC showed the clear benefit of 
utilizing ADR.  At both the FAA and AMC, bid protests are resolved earlier than they 
are at the GAO.  It appears that for most agencies a reluctance to utilize ADR as a 
means to resolve protests is an obstacle that impedes effective cooperation. 
Our research survey also indicated that there may be other reasons, beyond 
agency cooperation, that create obstacles to more effective cooperation between 
industry and government.  Numerous survey respondents cited the fact that they 
believe agency-level protest procedures could be more effective, if unsuccessful 
offerors had greater trust in the agency.  In this regard, trust seems to be a major 
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remedial action when appropriate, or to have an impartial and transparent resolution 
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VIII. Recommendations and Areas for Further 
Research 
A. Recommendations 
1. The Case for Fiscal Disincentives Beyond Truly Frivolous 
Protests is not Demonstrated, but GAO Rules Must Include COFC-
Style Sanctions   
Our research has revealed that agency personnel have strong opinions 
regarding the need for some type of disincentives for unsuccessful protestors.  The 
opinions range from “loser pays” scenarios, where the losing party to the protest 
must reimburse the other for the cost of the unsuccessful litigation, to more reserved 
opinions, where penalties are only assessed for those protests that are deemed to 
be truly frivolous. 
There is no doubt that the lack of disincentives for filing an unsuccessful 
protest may contribute to the litigious desires of a would-be protestor.  Nonetheless, 
we are not convinced that such disincentives are prudent, Constitutional, or conform 
to the international obligations of the United States.  While such a procedure may 
very well reduce the negative impact frivolous protests have on the acquisition 
system, it may do so at the expense of legitimate protests.  Such disincentives may 
actually discourage participation in the federal contracting process and, as a result, 
competition may decrease (Kepplinger, 2009a, p. 13).  Further, in order to determine 
whether or not a protest is indeed frivolous, it would require additional action on the 
part of the GAO.  Currently, the GAO determines initially whether or not a protest 
meets the requirements for filing a protest (timely, an interested party, etc.) and 
subsequently determines the merit of the protest.  In order to determine that a 
protest is sanctionable as frivolous, the GAO would have to make a separate 
determination. This new determination might provide deterrence, but at the cost of 
additional litigation.  Further, unless carefully crafted, such disincentives or penalties 
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right of free speech and the right to petition the government for the redress of 
grievances, or the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.  For example, the 
Supreme Court held in Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Relations 
Board (1983), that a federal agency cannot halt lawsuits brought, even for improper 
motives, unless those lawsuits are based on “intentional falsehoods or on knowingly 
frivolous claims,” or otherwise lack a reasonable basis. In another case, California 
Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (1972), the Supreme Court held that 
federal antitrust laws may penalize businesses bringing lawsuits and petitions to 
federal agencies only if such petitions and lawsuits are “a mere sham to cover what 
is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with a business 
relationship of a competitor.”  Federal appellate courts also identified two limited 
ways that can render a legal action frivolous:  
First, a legal action is considered “frivolous as filed” when a plaintiff or 
appellant grounds its case on arguments or issues “that are beyond 
the reasonable contemplation of fair-minded people, and no basis for 
[the party’s position] in law or fact can be or is even arguably shown.”  . 
. . Second, a legal action is considered “frivolous as argued” when a 
plaintiff or appellant has not dealt fairly with the court, has significantly 
misrepresented the law or facts, or has abused the judicial process by 
repeatedly litigating the same issue in the same court. (Kepplinger, 
2009a, p. 11)   
 
Any restriction, disincentives, or penalties for strategic protests against the public 
interest would have to meet the federal courts’ stringent requirements.  Finally, the 
United States agreed to provide effective bid protest mechanisms as part of the 
World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement and agreed to 
effective non-discrimination in procurement as part of the Reciprocal Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memoranda of Understanding (Miller, 2009, p. 
93).  Care must be taken to ensure that any restrictions conform to our international 
trade obligations and agreed-upon standards of fairness.  
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims provides a useful model for sanctions 
against improper bid protests.  Under Rule 11 of the Rules of the Court of Federal 
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1) is being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 
unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; 
2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law;  
3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and  
4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if 
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of 
information.    
Necessarily, a protestor would have some right to due process in order to 
“avoid punishing a company for filing a good-faith but unmeritorious protest” 
(Kepplinger, 2009a, p. 13).  This process may actually make the overall protest 
process longer, which could have potential negative impacts on the acquisition 
system.  However, bringing the GAO Bid Protest Regulations (2010) to parity with 
the COFC concerning sanctions for truly frivolous protests could provide a deterrent 
and, more importantly, address the perception that the GAO may be welcoming 
frivolous protests.   
2.   Standards for Mandatory Stay Overrides in the CICA and Agency 
FAR Supplements Must be Clarified and Re-Balanced to Protect 
Taxpayers and the Troops, Not Just the Protesters 
Our research demonstrates that contracting agencies must be much more 
aggressive at issuing and defending overrides of mandatory CICA stays triggered by 
filing GAO protests.  At the same time, our research shows that the fault does not lie 
entirely with the agencies.  COFC interpretations of what the CICA requires to 
sustain an override seem to be clearly in conflict with each other and with the 
question most important to the contracting agency, that of validity of contract 
awards.  These COFC interpretations seem to lack balance between the interests of 
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Comptroller General, and the Federal Acquisition Regulation Council should clarify 
and strengthen the CICA override standards.      
3.  Agency-Level Protests Must Be Made More Transparent and 
Trustworthy to Be Truly Effective 
Our research reveals that experts in federal agencies recognize the value of 
agency-level protests as a speedier, less costly, less adversarial alternative to 
litigation.  The Army Materiel Command experience is particularly instructive on this 
point.  However, contractors appear to distrust the agency-level protest process.  If 
Congress and the executive branch are serious about reducing litigation delays and 
costs, they may want to improve the transparency and trustworthiness of the 
agency-level protest process.  Specifically, the CICA and FAR Part 33 may be 
amended to provide for greater disclosure of procurement information, mandatory 
impartial review above the contracting officer level, publication of agency-level 
protest decisions, and continuation of mandatory stays between agency-level 
protests and any subsequent GAO protests.  Once agency-level protests earn the 
trust of the federal contracting community, it may be worthwhile to require 
contractors to exhaust their agency-level protest remedies before filing protests with 
the GAO or the Court of Federal Claims.   
4.  The ADRA Must Be Strengthened to Limit Grounds for Refusing 
ADR 
Our research reveals that at least some federal agencies may be tacitly 
condoning or encouraging the litigation of bid protests at the GAO.  While the ADRA 
allows the U.S. government to decline ADR in certain circumstances, our research 
shows that contracting agencies are litigating bid protests far more often than even 
the agencies themselves find appropriate.  In addition, our research reveals that 
agencies go along with GAO protests for improper reasons not authorized under the 
ADRA.  Congress should take steps to toughen the ADRA in order to ensure that 
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5. ADR Should Be the Default Dispute Resolution in Federal 
Procurement Protests  
Our research shows that the executive branch has extensive experience with 
ADR as the default bid protest resolution system.  Originally created as an 
exceptional experiment, the protest system at the Federal Aviation Administration 
ODRA demonstrated its ability to provide significant time savings and achieve 
protest resolution in a less disruptive manner than the GAO protests.  Congress 
should now take the FAA ODRA’s lessons and replicate them across the federal 
government.     
6.  Agencies Must Be Required to Vigorously Object to GAO Protests 
When Appropriate 
Related to the matter of frivolous protests are agency actions designed to 
properly document their objections to a protest.  The GAO “dismisses protests, 
where appropriate, without the need to resolve whether the protest was frivolous” 
(Kepplinger, 2009a, p. 12).  It is incumbent on agencies, however, to object to 
protests when appropriate.  Our research revealed that many top acquisition and 
legal professionals believe frivolous protests frequently preclude effective resolution 
of bid protests.  Yet the very same individuals indicated that they believe their 
agencies infrequently raise vigorous objections in response to frivolous protests.  
Indeed, the last recorded “frivolous protest” objection was reported by the GAO back 
in 1996.  Since the GAO will dismiss protests that are frivolous or without merit, it is 
incumbent upon agency officials to raise objections to protests they deem to be 
frivolous or otherwise without merit.   
7. Agencies Must Provide Quality Mandatory and Non-Mandatory 
Debriefings to Prevent or Limit Strategic Protests 
Numerous survey respondents provided comments regarding the strategic 
reasons that may induce an unsuccessful offeror to file a protest.  One respondent 
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“circumvent FOIA.”  Respondents’ rationale is that by filing a protest, even if 
ultimately unsuccessful, the protestor may obtain some information that he can later 
use to his advantage.  One means by which agencies can prevent such behavior is 
to provide a high quality debriefing, regardless of whether a debriefing is mandatory.  
If an unsuccessful offeror has been thoroughly debriefed as to why he was not 
selected for award, he may not feel he needs any additional information, and as a 
result, he may be less inclined to file a protest.  A thorough debrief may also 
convince an unsuccessful offeror that he was, in fact, not prejudiced by the agency’s 
decision and, therefore, has no need to file a protest. 
Even with complete and thorough debriefings, some protestors will want to file 
a protest in order to seek information not otherwise available to them.  A change in 
agency policy could prevent this occurrence.  The information asymmetry that exists 
between the government and unsuccessful offerors may very well influence an 
offeror’s decision to protest.  Government agencies can prevent this from occurring 
by eliminating or reducing the asymmetry.  Information that is normally made 
available to an unsuccessful offeror only after having filed a protest should be made 
available to the offeror absent a formal protest filing.  This may eliminate one 
incentive that an unsuccessful offeror has in filing a protest. 
8. Defense Agencies Should Object to GAO Recommendations 
Whenever Military Needs so Require, and the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy and the Department of Justice Should 
Streamline the Process for Supporting Federal Agencies When 
the GAO Gets it Wrong 
Our research revealed that federal, and especially defense, agencies tend to 
follow the GAO blindly.  Significantly, not once did a defense agency refuse to follow 
GAO recommendations in order to field equipment to the troops.  Agencies have 
traditionally feared Congressional sanctions for refusing to follow the GAO, but 
research proves that this fear is unwarranted.  Indeed, our research shows that 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 145 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
concerning the latter’s refusal to follow the former’s protest recommendations, the 
Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Justice, Congress, and the 
President took the side of the Department of Defense.  However, the process for 
agencies to secure high-level support against wrong GAO recommendations is not 
well established within the executive branch.  The Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Council should make appropriate amendments.   
9. CICA and GAO Regulations Should Require Protesters to Post 
Bonds for the Cost of Interruption from CICA Stays  
Our review shows federal agencies may not have sufficient tools to reduce 
costs and delays from mandatory CICA stays.  On the contrary, under Rule 65 of the 
Court of Federal Claims (COFC, 2011), “[t]he court may issue a preliminary 
injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in an 
amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by 
any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.”  Further, under 
COFC (2011) Rule 65.1, “[t]he surety’s liability may be enforced on motion without 
an independent action.”  Congress or the GAO should introduce similar rules for 
GAO bid protests in order to compensate the taxpayers for the costs of at least 
some protests that are ultimately found to lack merit. 
10. Agency Lawyers and Acquisition Workforce Must Be Trained to 
Resolve Bid Protests in Accordance With Least Disruptive Paths 
Our research reveals that opportunities abound to utilize ADR and other 
dispute resolution flexibilities, even under current GAO regulations, COFC rules, and 
agency-level protest rules in FAR Part 33.  Unfortunately, our research also reveals 
that agencies rarely utilize all the tools available to reduce the delays and costs of 
bid protests.  In the beginning of this report, we showed that it is possible to map out 
with great detail the least disruptive and most cost-effective paths for resolution of 
bid protests, as well as related decision points.  Accordingly, we demonstrated that 
federal contracting officials can manage the bid protest process in the same 
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revealed significant gaps in the understanding of ADR and other flexibility tools by 
top federal acquisition experts.  Therefore, it is imperative that agency protest-
resolution procedures and related training programs for the acquisition workforce be 
revised and improved in order to help contracting officers master the least disruptive 
and most cost-effective resolution paths.  This training is particularly important in 
military agencies, which are characterized by lower incidents of negotiation and 
other types of ADR than civilian agencies.   
11. To Reduce Protests, Federal Agencies Should Design Acquisition 
Strategies Promoting Maximum Possible Competition  
Our research shows that one of the most effective ways to prevent bid 
protests is to design competitive acquisition strategies.  These strategies involve 
breaking up large consolidated contracts into smaller contracts, including the 
awarding of multiple-award contracts instead of single-award contracts.  The 
substantive provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act at Title 10, Section 
2304, the Small Business Act at Title 15, Section 644, the anti-consolidation 
legislation in Title 10, Section 2382, and FAR Part 16.5 all compel emphasis on such 
competitive contracts.  Now, Federal agencies must swiftly implement these statutes 
not only because that is required, but because doing so makes business sense and 
compensates the taxpayers through reduced protests and more efficiency.    
12. Federal Regulations Should Require Parties and Agency 
Acquisition Officials to Justify and Document Decisions not to 
Initiate or Use ADR, Stay Overrides, Express Options, Sanctions 
for Truly Frivolous Filings, and Other Similar Tools 
Our review of the Federal Aviation Administration ODRA procedures 
highlighted the primary use of ADR to resolve protests.  We noted the fact that the 
ODRA was able to resolve protests more quickly than the GAO’s bid protest 
process.  Within the ODRA, there is an overriding presumption that parties will 
resolve protests through ADR.  If unable to utilize ADR, both parties must submit 
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parties will utilize ADR, unless there is a countervailing reason to the contrary, is a 
primary driver behind the ODRA’s processes.  The GAO, in its regulations, and the 
executive branch, through the Federal Acquisition Regulation or agency 
supplements, should adopt a similar procedural policy, and require each party to 
conduct cost-benefit analysis and affirmatively demonstrate why ADR cannot be 
utilized to resolve the protest.  Such a policy would likely reduce the time delays and 
costs an agency must endure during a bid protest.  Agencies should also be 
required to formally demonstrate why they did not seek dismissal as frivolous or 
meritless, sanctions, early corrective action, or stay overrides.  Any such justification 
documents must include business analysis that the costs of formal litigation under 
the regular process at the GAO and compliance with the GAO recommendations 
would outweigh the benefits of ADR and/or expedited procedures.  The analysis 
should take into account the potential for disruption that can be created when a post-
award protester may seek a pre-award remedy of cancellation and change in the 
acquisition strategy.  Agencies should be proactive in initiating ADR and not wait 
until the GAO’s negotiation assistance or outcome prediction.    
B. Areas for Further Research 
Our research has revealed a number of areas of study that warrant additional 
research.  Specific areas of study include the following: 
 Analyze and document contractor motivation to file a protest.  Such 
research should include a thorough understanding of the business 
decisions that either constrain or enhance a contractor’s motivation to 
file a protest. 
 Conduct further analysis into debriefing procedures.  Best practices for 
conducting a successful debriefing need to be researched and 
documented. 
 Research areas of strategy and practices that survey respondents 
cited with minimal frequency.  A number of these strategies and 
practices appear useful in mitigating the negative effect of reducing the 
impact of bid protests, yet they are underreported in our research.  
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 Acquisition planning was the most commonly cited strategy or practice 
to minimize the impact of bid protests on the acquisition process.  Best 
practices for all facets of acquisition planning should be researched 
and documented. 
 The lack of financial disincentives for unsuccessful offerors was a 
highly cited policy that precludes the effective resolution or avoidance 
of bid protests.  Although we have previously stated our 
recommendation on this policy, we nonetheless feel that further 
research is warranted.  Specifically, research must be conducted into 
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Appendix A. ADR Definitions 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ELECTRONIC GUIDE TO FEDERAL PROCUREMENT ADR
ADR Definitions 
The following are some commonly used definitions of ADR terms applicable 
to procurement-related ADR.  Agencies may differ in the manner in which they 
define such terms.  Also, some of these terms may be used differently in other 
contexts. 
Arbitration - A dispute resolution process whereby a neutral third-party is 
empowered by agreement of the parties to issue a decision on the controversy, 
following the conduct of a trial-like hearing.  An arbitrator's decision is generally 
binding and not reversible, absent fraud or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator.  
Arbitrators often are asked to attempt to mediate (see below) a settlement first, and 
to impose a decision on the parties only as a last resort.  This hybrid process is 
frequently referred to as "Med/Arb". 
Conciliation - Efforts by a neutral third party to assist in the resolution of an 
issue in controversy, including holding meetings with individual parties to discuss the 
controversy and potential solutions; contacting individual parties by telephone or 
mail, and serving as a conduit for information between them. 
Early Neutral Evaluation - The process by which an neutral third party 
imparts to the parties his/her views as to the strengths and weaknesses of their 
respective positions relating to an issue in controversy.  This process frequently is 
combined with conciliation or mediation. 
Fact Finding - A process in which a neutral third party assists the parties to 
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Frequently, fact finding will be engaged in as a prelude to mediation. 
Mediation - An effort by a neutral third party to resolve an issue in 
controversy through the conduct of face-to-face meetings between the disputing 
parties.  The third party is not authorized to impose a settlement upon the parties, 
but rather seeks to assist the parties in fashioning a mutually satisfactory solution to 
the issue in controversy.  Mediation can take two forms: (1) facilitative mediation -- 
in which the mediator simply facilitates discussions between or among the parties 
and does not provide any form of evaluation of the merits of their respective 
positions; and (2) evaluative mediation -- in which the mediator provides the 
parties, either individually or jointly, with early neutral evaluation (see above), i.e., 
his/her views as to the strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions, in 
conjunction with the mediator's efforts to help the parties fashion an amicable 
resolution to their controversy. 
Mini-Trial - A procedure where the parties make abbreviated presentations to 
a neutral third party who sits with the parties' designated principal representatives as 
a mini-trial panel to hear and evaluate evidence relating to an issue in controversy.  
The neutral may thereafter meet with the principal representatives to attempt to 
mediate a settlement.  The mini-trial process may also be a prelude to the neutral's 
issuance of either a formal written non-binding advisory opinion or to the neutral's 
rendering of a binding arbitration award. 
Ombuds - An individual who has been designated as a confidential and 
informal information resource, communications channel, complaint-handler and 
dispute-resolver.  The ombuds role was intended to be an antidote to abuses of 
governmental and bureaucratic authority and administration, and ombuds may serve 
as effective intervenors in cases of arbitrary decision making.   
Summary Trial With Binding Decision - A binding ADR procedure utilized 
by Boards of Contract Appeals wherein the parties make abbreviated evidentiary 
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summary binding and non-appealable decision.  The decision, frequently rendered 
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Appendix C.  List of Federal Agencies Solicited 
Department of Agriculture  
Department of Commerce  
Department of Defense (DLA) 
Department of Education 
Department of Energy 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Department of Homeland Security (Coast Guard) 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 
Department of Interior 
Department of Justice  
Department of Labor 
Department of State 
Department of the Air Force 
Department of the Army  
Department of the Navy (Navy and Marine Corps) 
Department of Transportation 
Department of Treasury  
Department of Veterans Affairs  
General Services Administration  
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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